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Abstract
Is China's Social Credit System leading the way to a dystopian future? ‘Yes’, claims Wessel Reijers,
who identifies dangerous dictatorial tendencies that do not live up to the promise of cultivating civic
virtue. ‘No’, argues Jens van 't Klooster, who sees it as a promising way to enhance distributive justice
and an alternative for price mechanisms in market economies. In an online symposium, we have asked
several eminent scholars to take sides in this timely controversy concerning an unparalleled effort of
social engineering that will soon influence the lives of over a billion citizens. Is the Social Credit System
a ‘digital dictatorship’ or a ‘digital republic’? How unique it is in a comparative and historical
perspective? Is a social credit system good for women? And what are the implications of the system on
the institution of citizenship?
Kickoffs by Wessel Reijers and Jens van ‘t Klooster; contributions by Yongxi Chen, Jiahong Chen,
John Cheney-Lippold, Jeremy Daum, Costica Dumbrava, Jelena Dzankic, Joshua Fairfield, Primavera
de Filippi, Cristie Ford, Francesca Lagioia, Miriam Müller, Liav Orgad, Alberto Romele, Giovanni
Sartor, Mathias Siems, Mac Sithigh.
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How to Make ‘The Perfect’ Citizen?
Wessel Reijers*
‘How to make the perfect citizen’? This question might have crossed the minds of the Chinese
government officials who, in 2014, formulated the idea of a Social Credit System1. China is a vast
country, with thousands of local units of government, innumerable businesses, and far over a billion
inhabitants. Governing such a giant, while taking care of rampant corruption, public unrests, and
fluctuations in the global and local economies is not an easy task. Yet, ‘fortunately’ for the Chinese
government, the last decade has brought about a huge shift in the infrastructure, which has been
transformed from a pre-digital ecosystem of cash payments and messy real-world interactions towards
an ecosystem of digital payments through Baidu Pay, the online distribution of goods through Alibaba,
and the sharing of millions of messages and data files through WeChat2. This infrastructure offers new
prospects for the Chinese government’s idea of the Social Credit System. It has handed it effective tools
to monitor its citizens’ behaviours, giving each citizen a ‘score’ based on behaviour, and implementing
a connected system of incentives3.

Scoring Citizens
The Chinese Social Credit System gets easily likened to dystopian science fiction scenarios in the West,
which at least in part seems to be related to the authoritarian character of the Chinese state. However, it
seems wrong to assess the system merely in relation to the potentially nefarious tendencies of Xi
Jinping’s administration, exemplified by rampant human right abuses, oppression of minorities, and
political persecutions4. Notwithstanding these terrifying practices, we should ask: is the implementation
of a Social Credit System leading to a dystopian political system? More specifically, I ask: is such a
system more akin to a digital republic or a digital dictatorship? The answer I give is that the ‘making’
of citizens implied in Social Credit Systems limits the political freedom of citizens to act virtuously and
promotes dictatorial rule.
In terms of the technical properties, I define a Social Credit System as any system of governance that
uses surveillance capacities of the state and/or private entities to trace behaviours of citizens, assigns
scores to citizens, and incentivises behaviours by means of awards or sanctions based on the scores. I
depart from what I believe is the crucial difference between such a system and other means for either
keeping public order or scoring individuals based on their behaviour. This essential difference lies in (1)
tying the score based on multiple behaviours to who someone is, as an entity that persists through time
(i.e., to a person’s moral character), (2) tying the score to a person as a citizen, and not merely for
instance as a taxi passenger (e.g., in getting an Uber score) or a car driver (e.g., in getting traffic penalty
points).
With regard to the first issue, I would like to point at considerations for tying offences such as major
crimes to a person’s permanent criminal record and for excluding minor offences from such a record.
Tying offences to a permanent record entails something about the person in question: they become part
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of someone’s history as a good or bad citizen in the eyes of the public. A Social Credit System extends
the notion of a permanent record tied to a person to many kinds of everyday behaviours. The second
point can be illustrated by referring to the notion of civic virtue invoked by the Chinese policy document
on the Social Credit System, which does not merely relate to be a good civil servant or a good consumer,
but to be a good citizen. In other words, it is not just the score but also its integral character (i.e., linking
heterogeneous activities such as jaywalking to having access to train tickets) that sets it apart from other
scoring systems.

Promoting Civic Virtue?
Essentially, a Social Credit System aims to make good citizens, qua citizens, through promoting civic
virtues such as ‘trustworthiness’. This aim seems to resonate with republican thought, which emphasises
the vital importance of the cultivation of civic virtue. However, the dispositions cultivated by a Social
Credit System cannot be rightfully designated as civic virtues for two reasons: (1) because a score
constitutes an aim external to any ‘virtuous action’, and (2) because the resulting activity tends to
conformity rather than to distinction in the public sphere.
First, as Aristotle5 indicated, we can consider three ‘ultimate goods’ of action – pleasure, honour and
eudaimonia. ‘Pleasure’ and ‘honour’ are not self-contained, meaning that pleasure depends on some
external stimulus (e.g., consuming food) and honour depends on the external approval of others (e.g.,
having a reputation in making a work of art). Only actions aimed at ‘eudaimonia’ are self-contained,
meaning that their aim is achieved in acting (e.g., courage is attained in acting courageously). Virtue,
according to this reading, is the disposition that aims at eudaimonia and does not entail aiming at
anything external, such as money or reputation. A Social Credit System seems to contradict this notion
of virtue. On the one hand, it promotes activities such as labouring for the community because it offers
a standard of reputation that can be a source of honour – for instance, in seeking to receive the highest
credit score in the neighbourhood. On the other hand, it promotes activities based on expected pleasure
(e.g., receiving discounts on certain consumption items) or pain (e.g., being put on a blacklist).
Second, as Hannah Arendt6 argued, virtuous action requires a citizen to be able to distinguish
her/himself in the public sphere. Crucially, this means that the outcomes of a citizen’s actions can always
be unexpected because they constitute what might be an exceptional, hence ‘excellent’ activity. In other
words, acting virtuously is not merely acting in an agreeable manner or following known social
conventions, but it means standing out by distinguishing oneself. This notion of the distinction entails
that for virtuous actions, there can be no fixed measurements or standards based on past, generic
behaviours. A Social Credit System contradicts this notion of virtuous action. In order to score citizens,
a certain list of categories or a catalogue need to be established, based on observable, expected
behaviours that lead to either positive or negative evaluations. For instance, donating money to charity
is a measurable, observable type of behaviour that could be positively evaluated. However, it in no way
constitutes an activity by which a citizen distinguishes herself in the public sphere. By subjecting ‘good’
and ‘bad’ actions to upfront categorisations based on what can be expected and measured, a Social Credit
Systems promotes conformity and therefore demotes civic virtue.
Hence, it is highly questionable that a Social Credit System would lead to the emergence of a ‘digital
republic’, neither in China nor elsewhere. Would it contain a tendency towards a digital dictatorship?
To answer this question, we would first need to clarify the meaning of a dictatorial governance. This
type of governance derives from the master-slave relation of the ruler and the ruled, characterised by the
absence of political freedom. I argue that Social Credit Systems contain a tendency towards a dictatorial
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rule, which I explicate according to its (1) output (i.e., the resulting behaviour of the ruled), and (2) input
(i.e., the method of governance applied by the ruling).

Virtuous Governance?
Firstly, I claim that the Social Credit System promotes ‘slavish’ behaviour. Being a slave means
essentially to be unfree, which can be explicated as (1) being subject to necessity (i.e., having to ‘make
a living’ through labour), and (2) being excluded from the public realm in which one can act and speak
amongst other citizens. By linking civic behaviour, such as having online discussions, with production
and consumption, such as having access to train tickets or cleaning the neighbourhood, the incentives
mechanisms of a Social Credit System can become part of life’s necessity. Certainly, many of the
behaviours linked to the categories of the Social Credit System remain voluntary (e.g., one can choose
to donate to a designated charity) but reckoning with the social credit score itself becomes a necessity.
In Arendt’s terms, civic behaviour in the public realm gets progressively transformed into labour, the
human activity aimed at continual production and consumption, which is essentially an unfree activity.
In other words: the more people’s lives are dominated by a-political or anti-political concerns ‘in public’,
such as by labouring for the sake of the social credit score, the less they are free to participate in political
activities. Hence, the more citizens will have to reckon with the effects of their everyday actions on their
credit scores, the less they will be free to engage in political action in the public sphere.
Secondly, I argue that the type of governance involved in a Social Credit System promotes masterlike rule. The prototype of such rule is the mastery of a craftsman over his craft, because it implies full
control over both means (e.g., materials, instruments) and ends (e.g., a function of a technical object).
For this reason, Plato likened his ideal statesman to a craftsman, who would use his social engineering
skills to control his populous. It is not hard to see how the Social Credit System implies an effort of
social engineering, but what sets it apart from other forms of social engineering is its instrumentalisation
of the citizen. While the factory would instrumentalise the worker, the worker would be free from its
control outside of its walls and outside of the bounds of the working day. Citizenship, however,
permeates public life, which led Aristotle to ask whether the good citizen is in any way different from
the good human being. The underlying notion of a Social Credit System is therefore that the ruler, be it
one man or a collective, instrumentalises his subjects, and treats them as means towards a definite end
– which in the Chinese case is social order and the centralised power of the Communist Party.

Conclusion
We ought to be suspicious of Social Credit Systems like the one that is implemented in China, because
of their tendency to demote civic virtue and promote dictatorial rule. However, we need to make some
reservations concerning this conclusion. First, a perspective of western political philosophy is likely to
be incompatible in some respects with the Chinese Confucian political philosophy. Second, matters of
scale and scope of any Social Credit System should not be neglected. Although we did not discuss those,
it becomes immediately clear that a scoring system is less problematic when applied to a limited set of
activities (i.e., limited scale) or not to a person qua citizen but only, for instance, qua responsible traffic
participant (i.e., limited scope).
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3

Edited by Liav Orgad and Wessel Reijers

Rewarding Virtuous Citizens
Jens van ‘t Klooster*
A Social Credit System rewards those citizens who are seen as virtuous and punishes those who are not.
Consider someone with a low social credit rating resulting from traffic violations, a few missed loan
repayments, a divorce, and clipping nails in a public space. Would it be fair to ban this person from
flying? Few would think that is particularly fair. Indeed, the Chinese Social Credit System, as presented
by the western media, is widely seen as the height of technological dystopia.
But is that intuition well-founded? Wessel Reijers has sought to identify features that he takes to
justify a rejection of the Chinese Social Credit System but forgoes an equally critical consideration of
the alternatives. Relying on the market, the default solution of western societies is not more just. Indeed,
as I argue, while Social Credit Systems may have their flaws, (1) we tend to be very reluctant to apply
similarly stringent moral criteria to western capitalist institutions and, in fact, (2) a Social Credit System
may actually serve to make western societies more just. Nonetheless, while I am more sanguine than
Reijers about shaping the behaviour of citizens through Social Credit Systems, I agree that it is
potentially an incredibly powerful and dangerous social technology. We should not focus on the
technology itself, but rather on the political institutions that govern it.

What is a Social Credit System?
In its 2014 Planning Outline for the Construction of a Social Credit System, China formulated the
objectives of the Social Credit System as that of ‘raising the honest mentality and credit levels of the
entire society1’. To this end, it ‘uses encouragement to keep trust and constraints against breaking trust
as incentive mechanisms’. The Outline promises that the system will mark a major step in
‘comprehensively implementing the scientific development view and building a harmonious Socialist
society’.
The 2014 Outline goes on to list a wide range of pathologies that the Social Credit System is meant
to solve. Most fundamentally, there are not enough social institutions to incentivise trustworthy
behaviour. For the Chinese state, being trustworthy means primarily complying with the law and
adhering to contracts. This has become a problem in China because the rapid economic development
has eroded traditional social structures and given rise to a semi-autonomous private sphere that is
unstable and plagued by a range of social pathologies. Amongst those that the Outline identifies are
‘grave production safety accidents, food and drug security incidents […] commercial swindles,
production and sales of counterfeit products, tax evasion, fraudulent financial claims, academic
impropriety and other such phenomena’, which ‘cannot be stopped in spite of repeated bans’. In addition
to flaws in the legal system, financial markets are underdeveloped, services provided are insufficiently
regulated, and ‘the mechanisms to protect the rights and interests of credit information subjects are
flawed’. There is widespread discontent about these matters and ‘a difference between the extent of
sincerity in government affairs and judicial credibility, and the expectations of the popular masses’.
Because these problems are so diverse, it is not surprising that the 2014 Outline has prompted an
incredible range of initiatives at the levels of the central government, local government, and the private
sector. There is, accordingly, not one Chinese Social Credit System, but a range of initiatives aimed at
documenting the behaviour of citizens to punish breaches of social trust and reward trustworthiness.
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Defending the Social Credit System
The 2014 Outline lists severe problems facing China today. If Social Credit Systems indeed contribute
to the trustworthiness and responsible use of autonomy, that would be a strong case in its favour. If,
instead, all it does is to create fear and oppression, inhibiting individuals from using the freedom that
the private sphere provides them, that would be a strong case against the Social Credit System.
The truth is somewhere in the middle. Unlike Reijers, I do not take the justification of the Chinese
Social Credit System to depend on big questions such as our ideas about citizenship and utopic visions
of the just society. It also strikes me as unfair to cast the Social Credit System as a dystopian technology
by invoking moral standards, which we forgo applying to our western institutions. Indeed, as I show,
political philosophers tend to apply quite modest moral standards to western capitalist institutions.
The reason why philosophers have been less demanding in theorising the moral demands that apply
to western institutions, in particular those specific to a capitalist society, is that they do not do very well
in giving individuals what they morally deserve. Consider some well-established failings of a market
economy. First, in response to the specific concern raised by Reijers, markets, too, ‘make’ citizens by
incentivising a set of behaviours, which are unlikely to correspond to standards of virtuous action. The
price mechanism that underlies market exchanges is mostly sensitive to the skills needed to anticipate
market prices successfully. Second, even where the market does reward virtuous actions, it rarely does
so in a way that is proportionate to individual virtue. People who go to work all their lives diligently are
rarely those who are most rewarded, while many markets provide high rewards to only a small group of
participants. Finally, the price mechanism is past-focused. It tends to look more at what parents of
beneficiaries have done than what they have done. This is, in part, due to the dramatic failure of the
existing system of private credit assessment, one of the issues that the Chinese system is meant to
address, but also reflects a more general backward-looking tendency of the price mechanism.
Faced with these well-established facts, those who favour markets have tended to give up on the idea
that societal institutions should be evaluating in terms of how they reward virtue. Indeed, this is a striking
point of convergence between authors on the (moderate) left, such as John Rawls and Elizabeth
Anderson, as well as right-wing thinkers such as Friedrich Hayek. While these authors assign an
important role to the individual autonomy that the market enables, they believe that markets should not
be expected to reward virtue. Rather, markets should be evaluated by asking whether their outcomes are
justifiable. Unequal outcomes are just as long as they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
Hayek and Anderson have their conceptions of justice, but they agree that, if markets are justifiable,
there is no further question of whether virtue is adequately rewarded. By this standard, the Social Credit
System seems to do just fine.

A Social Credit System for the West
Let me go further and suggest that a well-designed Social Credit System might make western capitalist
societies more just (although not all systems currently promoted by the Chinese state are Social Credit
Systems in that sense).
Similar to Reijers’s definition, I take a Social Credit Systems to be an institution that has two features:
(1) a centralised way of rating the virtuousness of citizens based on observable traits, linked to (2)
societal rules that reward individuals with high ratings and punish those with low ratings. In light of
these criteria, some systems introduced under the Social Credit System-heading are better understood
as traditional coercive punishment systems. They focus on specific behaviours, such as entering the
cockpit during a flight, and involve proportionate punishments, such as losing access to credit or being
banned from air flight.
A Social Credit System is different than a punishment system in that a social credit rating mediates
between behaviour and individual freedom. The Chinese Social Credit Systems seek to incentivise a
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range of behaviours associated with adherence to promises and rules as well as other social virtues. To
this end, a Social Credit System can rate individuals for behaviours that are neither legally prohibited
nor morally wrong – e.g., parking cars, divorcing, and clipping nails on public transport. Based on such
a broad set of socially desirable behaviours and personality traits, the Social Credit System rates the
virtuousness of individual citizens, which in turn affects the opportunities and resources that are
available to them.
A Social Credit System of this targeted kind can ameliorate all three objections that I listed. First,
although a Social Credit System will be coercive on the individual level, its design can result from
collective, democratic deliberation and thus it is potentially sensitive to a much wider range of
behaviours that are seen to merit reward. Basically, any behaviour that can be reliably measured is a
potential input for a social credit rating. Second, ratings can be designed to ensure a reward in proportion
to a social virtue. Finally, a social credit rating is future-oriented in that it seeks to predict individual
behaviour, rather than merely rewarding virtuous behaviour that occurred in the past.

The Politics of Social Credit Systems
There are many moral objections that critics might wield against Social Credit Systems, and I do not
want to suggest that there are no real worries. In particular, there is a range of concerns that, while they
do not apply to Social Credit Systems per se, illustrate the need for an appropriate set of background
institutions. For one, there are procedural concerns over the design and operation of the Social Credit
System. For the Chinese Social Credit System, it is currently not possible to appeal both individual
ratings and the consequences of these ratings for individuals. Likewise, there is a serious concern
regarding privacy stemming from the fact that its aggregative ratings are based on widespread
surveillance of individual behaviour. Finally, the rules that govern the assignment of ratings are often
opaque. Without wanting to downplay any of these objections, I think it is fair to say that they are not
about Social Credit Systems per se, but rather about the set of political institutions in which they are
embedded. All of this is not surprising since Social Credit Systems are potentially an incredibly powerful
social technology, which comes with potentially large benefits and yet equally with risks.
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Treating China as a ‘Normal’ Country
Mathias Siems* and Mac Sithigh**
Introduction
In comparative law, it is often said that the law of countries of the East Asian legal family is markedly
different from western conceptions of law. For example, while western countries prefer a ‘struggle for
law’ with winners and losers, in East Asia personal relations and networks are often seen more
important. However, there have been some challenges to this position. For example, Bruce Aronson –
an expert on Japanese law – suggests that ‘[o]ur perceptions of Japan, related to (…) a preoccupation
with cultural explanations, may hinder, rather than aid, careful analysis of Japanese law and its impact
on society’; thus, he proposes that we should ‘treat Japan as a “normal” country that has both similarities
to and differences with other advanced societies1’.
An analogous dialectic can be applied to the Chinese Social Credit System. Some observers
emphasise its uniqueness2, also calling it a ‘great innovation’3, or – from a critical perspective – equating
it with an ‘Orwellian nightmare’4. Taking the position of Chinese exceptionalism, it may be argued that
it would be inappropriate to apply western notions of virtue or justice (e.g., by Aristotle or Hannah
Arendt, see the contribution by Reijers; or by Rawls, see the contribution by van’t Klooster).
This blog post – and the corresponding paper on which it is based5 – suggests that it is preferable to
regard it as a specific instance of a wider phenomenon. In this respect, China may be considered as a
‘normal country’ that starts experimenting with rating-based forms of governance. This position does
not imply an uncritical perspective, given that any rating system operates in a regulatory context;
reflecting on the question also addressed in the other blog posts of this debate (Reijers and van’t
Klooster), this post will suggest that whether or not these systems present a ‘dystopian future’ depends
on their regulatory environments.

Variants of Social Credit Systems in China and the West
Generally, three versions of the Chinese Social Credit System can be distinguished: China-wide
blacklists, compliance scores by pilot cities, and social credit scores by financial institutions. It should
also be noted that many of those elements are a moving target. For example, the local schemes are
deliberately used to experiment with different forms of ratings, in particular in the input data that may
be considered (e.g., whether these mainly include violations of the law or also other behavioural data).
As regards to the scores by financial institutions, western observers focus on the Sesame Credit scores
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that consider not only financial credit records but also, for example, personal information and social
relationships; yet, these scores are about to be incorporated in a scoring system by the People’s Bank of
China with the precise scope not yet decided.
In the West, many countries know financial consumer credit scores or ratings, and recent years have
seen a proliferation of rating systems in relation to online platforms and the ‘sharing economy’, such as
eBay, Uber, and Airbnb. Recent innovations reflect the availability of novel sources of data. A subject’s
use of social media or of sharing economy sites can, for instance, be used as a proxy for creditworthiness.
Thus, an Australian scheme for alternative (and significantly cheaper) deposits on rented properties,
Trustbond, makes use of both types of data6; a Singapore-based lender, Lenddo, claims to use ‘nontraditional data…to economically empower the emerging middle class’, which includes various social
media sources7; and a U.S. firm, Tala, operates in developing nations in Africa and Asia, claims to utilise
up to 10,000 ‘data points’, such as social media and smartphone use, in order to create a new type of
credit score to the advantage of lower-income customers8. There have also been forms of aggregation:
for example, Traity (a former partner of Trustbond) explains its role as assisting users to ‘gather …
reputation from different data sources so that [they] can control it, own it, and leverage [it]9’.
Comparing China and the West, some specific parallels can be identified. For example, as part of the
Social Credit System, China uses blacklists of persons who have violated the law in order to exclude
them from many aspects of social life with the help of data sharing. This may be related to the use of
background checks and ‘no-fly lists’ in the U.S.10; or that in Israel, codes (based on various data) are
assigned to passengers as part of a distinctive ‘risk-based’ security system11. In many countries, criminal
records and details of insolvent debtors are also collected and may be shared more or less widely in a
number of European states. And even in respect of private sector services (e.g., in the sharing economy),
a poor reputation can exclude individuals from these emerging markets, with far-reaching consequences
for their financial position and participation in some aspects of urban life.
It can also be shown that the design and regulation of today’s rating systems are already clear
examples of policy diffusion. The Chinese system partly derives from its western counterparts: the
financial credit scoring systems of western countries have been an explicit source of influence12, and
tools such as the Sesame Credit scores may be seen as an example of the ‘gamification’ of rating systems
in recent time. In return, the growing global influence of China can mean that the Social Credit System
may well be a regulatory tool that could inspire the West: it may show that China now ‘appears to have
ascended to the position of principal global driving force in political theory and action’, with ‘the
potential to change law and government as we know them in China and beyond13’.
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Conclusion
Will China’s Social Credit System lead the way to a dystopian future? Our answer is that this very much
depends on the way the Chinese models as well its western counterparts evolve. Then, a number of
related questions emerge. For example, could there be mixtures between the Chinese and western
models? If reputation and rating systems consolidate in western markets in a similar fashion, what
opportunities, features, controversies, and pitfalls will arise? And how could lawmakers intervene if this
happens?
Crucially, any assessment also depends on the legal and regulatory tools that states will adopt. Thus,
by contrast to the binary distinction suggested in the blog post by Reijers, we take the position that it is
these tools which determine whether it may be rather seen as a form of ‘digital republic’ or ‘digital
dictatorship’. Technically speaking, any such regulatory tools either be implemented through the
introduction of a new regulatory regime or the application of general requirements to a particular
context. It may also be unlikely that there will be a single ‘law on ratings’ given the relevance of many
overlapping policy considerations and corresponding fields of law, such as e-commerce law, privacy
and data protection law, anti-discrimination law, tort law, competition law, sector-specific regulation on
financial services etc. However, the growing interest in the regulation of powerful ‘platforms’, as seen
in the recent work of the European Commission, may indicate the type of approach likely to be favoured
in the coming years.
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Social Reproduction and Social Credit Apparatuses
John Cheney-Lippold*
Dystopia is a peculiar concept. Like dark matter or ‘the market’, dystopias are generally difficult to find
in the wild even when there are always ‘future dystopias’ looming on the horizon. While many places
on earth may already deserve the title – Congolese cobalt mines, the Gaza Strip, secret Chicago prisons
– our interpretation of dystopia is chiefly one based on temporality. Things are changing, and we fear
the worst will happen. Or, what’s happening is bad, but don’t worry – it gets worse.
The types of futuristic societies envisioned by Reijers and van ‘t Klooster provide outwardly
opposing views. But whether dystopian or not, the ‘social’ of the Social Credit System under debate
remains largely untroubled. For Reijers, it’s simply an instrumentalised ‘social order’ within China; for
van ‘t Klooster, it’s an ideal market with potential for just consequences. The social serves as a
placeholder for something more, an unstated premise that hides in plain sight.
In the case of China, the dystopian algorithmic future of this placeholder is seasoned by Orientalist
appreciation. The widely cited Bonaparte quotation ‘China is a sleeping lion. Let her sleep, for when
she wakes, she will shake the world’ locates this futurity on a terrain of awe-inspired fear. In a 2014
speech in Paris, even Chinese President Xi Jinping recited the passage, marshalling the implied danger
that establishes China as an imminent, not-to-be-messed-with seismic force to an apprehensive French
audience.
And for the West, with the narrativised help of Black Mirror’s ‘Nosedive’, China’s Social Credit
System supplies the ‘ur text’ of the intersection between technology and dystopia for the contemporary
era. But while Social Credit Systems of any form are appalling for many reasons, I want to resist a
relying on a good vs. bad framing without taking a breath to assess a presupposition. What do all Social
Credit Systems purportedly want; what is the ‘social’ in social credit? I answer with conventional
wisdom from digital studies, science and technology studies, and critical theory: to reproduce the social,
just as asymmetric, biased, and discriminating as it was when it was born.

Social, So What?
I am no expert of China. And while I am a professor who writes and teaches on digital technology and
cultural studies, my interest in the issue of China’s Social Credit System is one that does not necessarily
fit the typical Orwellian shade of authoritarianism. I propose we briefly remove China from our analysis
and think about ‘Social Credit System’ in the abstract, alleviating some of the more problematic points
of cross-cultural pressure - like racial othering and cultural fetishization - normally assigned to China
by a western audience. In doing so, I structure my perspective in an Althusserian form, concerned not
only with the power to make ‘good citizens’, but also the process by which that power is constructed
and maintained.
Abstracting a Social Credit System allows us to ask more general questions. Most important: what
in the world is ‘social’? Any social system, credit or not, needs to reproduce itself. For Althusser, the
social conditions of life are reproduced - just like labour power - through repression and/or ideological
interpellation. While Althusser’s perspective has been long-troubled by scholars, it remains a useful
analytic of the social that refuses a vague, neutral origin story. Rather, the social is a constantly
reorganised definition of community that always exploits some for the sake of others. Far from
Hobbesian or Lockean mythologies of harmonious nation-building, Althusser’s formulation apprehends
empowered difference, i.e., those with power vs. those without, as its structural a priori.
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But Social Credit Systems, in general, are more intimate than some rudimentary ideological relation.
Reijers: such a system ‘extends the notion of a permanent record tied to a person to a great many kinds
of everyday behaviours’, a tying that combines singular institutions of power (the police, education, the
media) into one agglomerated ideological social factory. This definition of society routes through the
calculations of biopolitics and statistics, scarred and disfigured by the founding limitations of
datafication.

Limits of Datafication
One limitation of datafication: as much as dystopian imaginations tend to universalise their anxieties
onto all aspects of life, there can be no completeness of surveillance and control. From Chinese Social
Credit to Facebook’s ‘Trustworthiness’ scale and to even Pinochet’s ‘Directory of Commercial
Information’, these systems rely on complex, but still incomplete, methods of deducing an individual’s
value to society. Subjects are not interpreted but forced to prefigure their actions based on how they are
datafied: smiling at a stranger won’t raise your score while buying vegetables will.
In this case, civic obligations are configured by the recognised perimeter of datafication, a streetlight
effect of virtue where civic virtue that is untranslatable into data gets demoted or ignored. While virtue
itself can never be separated from existing reward structures in society (in the U.S., ‘I Voted’ stickers,
not votes, operate as the real designation of virtue), an ideal of virtue configured according to data and
its algorithmic outcome pursue a value structure according to what is interpreted to be measured as
virtuous, not what may be socially deemed as virtuous. The social is reproduced in intermediary, databased, form.
Another limit of datafication: that Social Credit Systems rely exclusively on data means; subjects are
not just seen by power but seen by power through data. The production and reproduction of the social
is how data produces and reproduces its datafied subjects. Yet instances of datafication are exceedingly
social – and I do not mean this in a good way. Just like the social reproduces the social, readers interested
in questions of digital technology may be familiar with the fact that algorithmic processing of data also
inevitably reproduces existing biases and oppressions. Facial recognition systems are notoriously racist
and transphobic. Algorithmic hiring systems redouble sexism. Quantified self-tracking systems further
alienate and dispossess users with disabilities.
Datafication is thus an intensely political process, and that ‘any behaviour that can be reliably
measured is a potential input for a social credit rating’, citing van ‘t Klooster, should worry us. What it
means to ‘reliably measure’ is not merely a question of scientific method as measurement itself can only
exist within the realm of politics. We see this in China. While the persecuted Uyghur ethnic group in
the country’s western Xinjiang region are certainly repressed by security forces, the Uyghurs – their
faces and names – are also studied in ways that may technologically improve that repression. Just like
how the post-9/11 U.S. push to hire more Arabic translators allowed for increased surveillance and thus
measurement of Arab-speaking populations, measurement is not just using a ruler to assess the length
of an object. It is an intensely political act, an act where to ‘reliably measure’ this social in unqualified
form is, at face value, unjust. If an algorithmic Social Credit System led to dystopia, I would not blame
the algorithm but the ‘topia’ it comes from.

Qualifications for the Future
Ironic for an argument of abstraction, I end with an appeal for qualification. Much like an unqualified
‘citizen’ or ‘civic virtue’ – which strategically positions the rights and obligations of citizen away from
its lived, differential reality, and thus affirms an ideal that likely will not apply in practice – the qualified
examples of the U.S. and China show that not all types of people are citizens in the same way. The ideal
of the nation, and the society that grounds that ideal, is itself exclusionary. While Arab people in the
U.S. are formally citizens, their enacted practice of citizenship is ontologically conditioned through the
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lens of white supremacy. The same, but in distinct ways, with China and its Uyghur population. When
datafication reproduces the social, it is precisely this relationship of marginalization that is intentionally
and unintentionally datafied.
We need to both qualify subjects of surveillance and the underlying assumptions of that surveillance.
Neither capitalism nor socialism was discussed in Reijers or van ‘t Klooster – only an unqualified market
– in debates about the efficacy of Social Credit Systems for enforcing authoritarianism or producing
justice. I return to the original question: what is the ‘social’ of social credit? At the end of the day, these
systems are not currently for the demos. The social is deployed as a source of information, turned against
the demos by forces hegemonically empowered to maintain ideological control. If there is to be any
justice, I would most intently ask: how do we make a Social Credit System democratically operated –
not a social credit by a socialist Social Credit System?
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The Docile Minds of Perfect Societies
Jelena Džankić*
Human behaviour has always been assessed and judged in some ways, be it through the most basic social
interaction and benchmarking; through observation of norm abidance in transparent and less transparent
ways; or, recently, through digital technologies. Wessel Reijers and Jens van t’ Klooster look at Social
Credit Systems as a rule by ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, based on structured observation and evaluation of
individual behaviour. Illustrating their arguments with the example of China’s Social Credit System
(SCS), they come to opposite conclusions about this model of governance. I acknowledge the merits of
van ‘t Klooster’s idea of the desert, implying that a Social Credit System may have positive effects on
distributive justice and offer appropriate alternatives for price mechanisms in market economies.
However, I ardently oppose the use of surveillance mechanisms in regulating the relationship between
individuals and governance structures. As a result of three interrelated dynamics, rather than creating
‘perfect’ citizens, Social Credit Systems are more likely to create calculated and passive subjects.

Discipline by Design
First, Social Credit Systems are tools for disciplining society. By design, they allow a centralised
authority to observe and evaluate individual behaviour. Their power is in channelling human action
towards the expected award and in avoidance of the possible sanction. Awareness of surveillance is
central to Social Credit Systems, as it can curtail free will and individual liberty. Just as in Bentham’s
panopticon, individuals have no certainty of whether they are observed at any given moment or not. This
motivates citizens to regulate their conduct under the assumption that they are being watched and
scrutinised. Hence, Social Credit Systems have the potential to create ‘docile minds’ – an extension of
the Foucauldian notion of ‘docile bodies’- through normalisation of subtle surveillance and acceptance
of transparent disciplinary mechanisms. A society composed of such ‘docile minds’ might lead to
smooth governance and reduce conflict horizontally (among individuals) and vertically (between
individuals and governance structures). If, for instance, a ‘perfect society’ is characterised merely by the
absence of conflict, then ‘docile minds’ are conducive to it. These ‘perfect citizens’ will, however, have
internalised the disciplining tools and forgotten their freedoms to such a degree that their ‘perfect
society’ will resemble a golden cage. A prison, paradoxically. And in no panopticon, be it golden or
digital, there is room for democracy because freedom is taken away by default.

A Society of Bystanders
Second, Social Credit Systems leave little room for valorising non-rewardable virtuous deeds or actions,
but recompense utilitarian ‘good’ acts. Reijers rightly points out that the core idea behind an SCS is to
‘make good citizens, qua citizens, through promoting certain civic virtues such as ‘trustworthiness’, but
that the problem with such an approach is the externalisation of the score to ‘virtuous action’. A ‘virtuous
action’, in itself, does not require a reputational or financial reward. Hence, any rewardable ‘good deed’
would represent an action of instrumental conformity. Allocating scores that do not take into account
the context of individual behaviour or action vis-à-vis rules will not create ‘perfect citizens’, but rather
may give birth to a society of bystanders and individuals acting exclusively on the basis of personal
utility. To illustrate this, imagine two scenarios where there exists a credit system with a fixed list of
deeds for which an individual receives positive and negative scores.

*

RCAS Fellow, GLOBALCIT, Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute.

European University Institute

13

Edited by Liav Orgad and Wessel Reijers

Scenario 1: Jack goes for a stroll around the neighbourhood. All of a sudden, he sees an elderly
woman having a heart attack on the other side of the street. To offer her help (an action bearing no
reward in terms of social score), Jack needs to engage in civil disobedience - cross the street illegally
(an act for which he will receive a negative social score). Under the Social Credit System, Jack would
be a ‘perfect’ citizen if he kept on walking and succumbed to bystander apathy of a ‘docile mind’.
Yet, would it make him less ‘perfect’ if he committed a non-rewardable deed of highest moral value,
which however presupposed a previous punishable action?
Scenario 2: Jill works as a taxi driver. She does not particularly like her job and is often rude to
customers (an act bearing a negative social score). However, she knows that her blood donations (an
action for which she would receive credits) will even out her behaviour towards her clients. Under
the rules of the Social Credit System, Jill is a ‘perfect’ citizen, even though her ‘good deeds’ are a
matter of instrumental conformism rather than expressions of virtue.

Slavish Behaviour
Third, sanctions inherent in Social Credit Systems have diffuse effects and as such are likely to induce
individuals to future ‘slavish behaviour’. Imagine Jack from the example above. His score has been
lowered because he was caught on camera jaywalking to save the old lady. For the sake of the argument
let’s also imagine that because of his action Jack cannot travel to visit his relatives, has a 30 per cent
higher electricity bill, and he has been denied a loan. This means that not only is Jack subject to a
sanction, but also it is diffused over many segments of his life. Once experienced the repercussions of
his action at different levels, Jack will be more likely to ‘play by the rules’. Furthermore, in a context
where surveillance of behaviour has been internalised, any public assessments of the quality of
governance are likely to be framed through false consciousness. This shift towards a passive and
obedient individual in the relationship with a central mandating authority implies a move from a free
decision-making citizen to a mere subject.
Perhaps my scepticism of the democratic potential of Social Credit Systems is a direct outcome of
my post-communist background. The lived past of surveillance by secret service that I experienced in
communist times was rather dystopian. The present digital surveillance of online activities to assess and
influence market behaviour (or, as the case of Cambridge Analytica has shown, political choices) is, to
say the least, problematic. The ‘brave new worlds’ of literary works often depict gloomy digital futures,
which are a direct product of normalisation of control and coercion by a central authority. To me, this
points to the fact that one will find no ‘perfect citizens’ inside a panopticon, be it digital or not. Rather,
it will be a golden cage hosting ‘docile minds’ - utilitarian bystanders and passive subjects.
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Seeing Like an Authoritarian State
Cristie Ford*
The Social Credit System (SCS), as proposed in China, provokes an interesting philosophical question.
Can human behaviour be moulded to create a better, fairer society by awarding ‘credit’ to those who
behave in ways seen as positive by some broad-based authority, in this case, the state? Is the SCS a
promising idea for developing a well-functioning society under conditions of complexity and diversity,
or is it a massive exercise in government control over virtually all aspects of citizens’ lives?
The SCS in China is not an abstract concept. If fully implemented, it would affect over one billion
human beings in a context marked by an increasingly authoritarian and surveillance-obsessed
government regime, extensive human rights abuses, political persecutions, and tragic 20th-century
history of state-sponsored citizen-on-citizen violence. To be clear, the SCS is being proposed by the
same government that is currently detaining hundreds of thousands, perhaps a million, of its ethnic
minority citizens in ‘re-education camps’ beyond the reach of its legal system1.
Against this background, it is not ‘wrong’ to assess SCS ‘merely in relation to the potentially
nefarious tendencies of Xi Jinping’s administration’, as Wessel Reijers suggests. On the contrary, it is
analytically problematic and perhaps amoral to proceed as if the SCS concept is a purely technocratic
initiative that exists at some metaphysical separation from the regime that spawned it.
To be fair, we should be sceptical that any state is more interested in enhancing genuine collective
virtue than in the surveillance and control that make its bureaucratic jobs easier. In Seeing Like a State,
James C. Scott showed how a state values ‘synoptic legibility’, or the ability to deeply see its citizens,
for its own purposes. Synoptic legibility makes it easier to tax people, conscript them, track them, and
punish them. Scott describes how the state – along with other agents of ‘homogenisation, uniformity,
grids, and heroic simplification’, including capitalism – tend to flatten outlived reality into forms that
are legible for its purposes2. It is not a surprise that any state might see the promise in new data tools.
At the same time, it is not a coincidence that an authoritarian regime is advancing these particular,
panoptic initiatives. The SCS is, at its root and in its purpose, inextricably entwined with a totalising
and pervasive state-driven project of surveillance, homogenisation, and fear.

Should a State Try to Allocate Moral Deserts?
Respecting human dignity requires at least three things from the state: it requires that the state not offend
– at a minimum – basic individual human rights; it requires the rule of law, when questions of individual
rights and responsibilities intersect with coercive state power; and it requires that the state not be utterly
panoptic, so that individuals have some scope for autonomy and privacy in their lives. President Xi’s
regime cannot be trusted to provide these things, but the problem with the SCS goes deeper than that.
For the sake of argument, let us imagine an SCS regime that respected at least the most basic human
and equality rights, and accorded citizens something resembling the rule of law. What would this look
like?
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First, the regime observes fundamental values around anti-discrimination; human autonomy, dignity,
and equality; and the ability to participate, through free speech and freedom of association, in public
life. Within the broad SCS mandate, which covers not just formal rights but also the ‘honest mentality’
(that is, presumably, the virtue and morality, and perhaps thoughts and intentions) of individuals,
equality and anti-discrimination provisions would have to be understood in correspondingly broad
terms. So, even if divorce is considered morally wrong and punishable under SCS, a woman divorcing
her abusive-to-the-point-of-homicidal husband would be exempt from punishment. She has done
nothing ‘wrong’. Homeless people are not further punished for sleeping under bridges, the old are not
punished for failing to contribute their labour, dissidents are not punished for speaking freely, and mental
illness does not algorithmically generate a worsening spiral of stigma and punishment. Being a follower
of a disfavoured religious tradition, or being gay or transgender, does not, at a minimum, generate
punishments that violate human rights. Republican thought, which Reijers alludes to, would go further
to impose an ethos of anti-domination that does not simply prevent the state from punishing people for
such personal and social characteristics; it would affirmatively acknowledge them as essential to an
empowering and emancipatory conception of citizenship3. But let us go with minimum protections.
Second, the SCS’s doling out of ‘encouragements’ and ‘constraints’ would have to be responsive to
some plausible version of the rule of law, meaning that the state is precluded from exercising power
arbitrarily. Procedural safeguards and meaningful appeal mechanisms are in place for citizens, and some
mechanism for state accountability is operating. For example, laws are administered by courts in which
the accused are entitled to procedural fairness and impartial judges give reasons, which can be appealed,
based on established methods of justification and by reference to basic human rights and constitutional
commitments. This too is necessary if basic human rights are to be protected not only in theory but also
in practice.
President Xi’s China will not meet the requirements above, and this is not a coincidence. It is difficult
to imagine President Xi’s SCS not discriminating against minority religious groups or political
dissidents, or financially irresponsible, and we cannot imagine people being accorded meaningful
procedural fairness rights. SCS is part and parcel of this regime’s priorities: a state that does not respect
individual human rights and does not provide procedural fairness is also the kind of state that would
conceive of a panoptic state-based regime for allocating moral deserts across a broad swath of human
action, thereby denying individuals scope for autonomy and privacy in their lives. An open state that
acknowledges diversity and perhaps even contestation, and respects individuals’ ability to decide for
themselves what constitutes a good life, is not the kind of state that dreams up SCS.

The State is Not the Market
Mathias Siems is correct in observing that whether SCS will be a ‘digital republic’ or a ‘digital
dictatorship’ will depend on context, and he is correct in observing that rating systems are proliferating
in the West as well. These systems also generate real risks, which we should be wary of4. It is also true
that, as Jens van’t Klooster notes, capitalist societies do not do well in ‘giving individuals what they
morally deserve’. Defined in that way, the market is clearly not ‘fair’. Yet these comparisons miss a
crucial point.
We should not equate state-directed surveillance and rating systems with the decentralised, partial,
and often commerce-based rating systems being developed in the West. It is not valid to compare the
market – a private, fundamentally decentralised system, which for all its considerable flaws no one yet
has managed to corner – with a centralised state apparatus, as mechanisms for allocating ‘moral deserts’.
3
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The market is not a mechanism for allocating moral deserts; it is a mechanism for exchange. And the
market exists in China too, where it is no more ‘fair’ than it is elsewhere.
Wealth accretes across generations in the West, but it also accretes across generations all over the
world and across history, except when war, or revolution, or large-scale tragedy disrupts the pattern5. In
this sense, SCS is not a ‘moral deserts’-based alternative that has much chance of supplanting other
structures for allocating power and rewards.

Learning from History
The West has some experience with state regimes, often associated with the provision or withholding of
social service benefits, which try to some degree to allocate moral deserts. These have often
disproportionately infringed on the dignity and privacy of the poor and marginalised6, which suggests
two things: that across societies, state-based moral deserts mechanisms may be likely to treat nonconforming or marginalised individuals and communities as objects of contempt; and that it is a good
thing that the people, who hand out social service benefits while asking invasive questions about a
person’s personal life, do not have more power and information than they do. But these are small
potatoes. Other parts of the world, and China above all, have had more extensive and far more painful
experience with virtue testing. The ideological purity tests and corresponding confessions, purges, and
mass violence that characterised the Cultural Revolution are hardly two generations behind us.
In our post-Foucaultian, decentralised, financialised world, it may seem old-fashioned to focus on
the state as a primary agent of oppression. It is provocative and intellectually interesting to equate
Chinese state action with market action under capitalism. But presumably, we can learn something from
those mid-20th-century western communists who favourably compared Soviet communism to liberalism
well through Stalin’s regime, ignoring its brutal reality in favour of intellectual engagement with its
possibility under Marxist theory7. Engaging with theory while ignoring context is itself a moral choice.
We should not be blind to authoritarianism because it is clothed in the rhetoric of civic virtue and
progress.
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An Illusion of Western Democracies
Alberto Romele*
Wessel Reijers criticises the Chinese Social Credit System for two reasons. Firstly, because it cannot
promote virtuous actions. According to the Aristotelian tradition to which Reijers refers, virtuous actions
cannot be determined by the pursuit of reputation, money, pleasure, etc. Acting virtuously is not acting
according to social conventions, but ‘standing out distinguishing oneself’. Secondly, the Social Credit
System denies the principle of virtuous governance by creating a master-slave relation between
government and citizens that undermines the Greek-western principle of political freedom.

The Illusion of Political Freedom
The thesis I propose is that the reason why the Social Credit System so scandalises westerners is not
because it is contrary to ‘our’ Aristotelian and Arendtian liberal political tradition. Rather, it is precisely
because it shows the illusion upon which this tradition is founded. This consists in believing that there
is a void at our disposal between people as ‘free’ citizens and the political as a set of laws.
Imagine that there was a large empty square, the mythical Athenian agora – not the real one, in which
there were at least twenty buildings and structures, each with its complex access and behaviour rituals.
Imagine further the mythical Athenian citizens – no children, women, or slaves. In this mythical empty
square, supported by a few basic rules, virtuous action entirely depends on the single citizen’s free will.
The Social Credit System scandalises westerners because it shows that such an ideal type does not
exist. On the one hand, no political or social actor acts virtuously, at least if by virtue one means the
self-contained search for the eudaimonia. On the other hand, all governments, at least from the 16th
century, have tried to fill the gap between the laws of government and the governmental practices by
making rules more granular. These are the two points I want to explain further.

The Absence of Disinterestedness
Firstly, I am convinced that there is no disinterested action, neither in political acting nor in other forms
of acting and speaking. Human acts are always ‘interested’, which means that one plays a social game
only if she believes that the game is worth playing1. Being interested in a specific social game is not the
result of cold calculation. On the contrary, it rather implies a belief in its value, and it also means
ultimately forgetting the game qua game. According to this perspective, virtuous is a person who best
acts according to the implicit rules of a social game he or she is playing.
According to the Aristotelian model of civic virtue, a virtuous person aims to act without being
influenced by the pursuit of ambition, money, or reputation. But this same virtuous action is in fact
determined by a series of rules that do not arise from the individual herself, but from the definition that
a certain tradition has given, which in the western context is primarily the liberal tradition. The act of
believing in this conception of virtue, and of reiterating the same rules, leads to the creation of a certain
habitus, a form of acting, thinking, and desiring common to all the people educated at the school of the
Aristotelian and liberal tradition. This allows the participant to this specific game to recognise,
appreciate, and judge each other according to the best and the worst. The Social Credit System does
nothing different, but it does so by starting from another premise; it privileges, probably for historical
and cultural reasons, social conventions rather than the standing out from the mass.
*
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Incidentally, I think, as Jens van ‘t Klooster underlines, that western societies are already full of
indicators that publicly signal our value as members of a liberal society. I do not mean by that that, by
centralising the ‘rules of the game’, the Social Credit System is fairer. Instead, it is based on dynamics
of domination, discrimination, and social exclusion (for instance, in terms of access to basic services
such as education, health, and food). Furthermore, the Social Credit System does not show the intention
to compensate for injustices – for example, by giving more credit for ‘virtuous’ actions carried out by
those coming from the segments of the populations that are least favoured in economic and cultural
terms.

Weak Normativity
As for the government, the Belgian political theorist Thomas Berns affirmed that at least from the 16thcentury, two forms of normativity have been pursued2. First, the normativity of the laws, which however
is often too abstract and detached from concrete citizens’ actions. Second, the ‘discrete’ and ‘weak’
normativity of numbers and quantification of the population.
The purpose of this second form of normativity is not to sanction crimes, but to correct small
infractions and deviant behaviours. ‘De minimis non curat lex’, ‘the law does not concern itself with
trifles’, and for this reason, another normativity is needed to deal with such trifles. Berns refers
especially to the works of the French political jurist and philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and to the
manner in which he, with other thinkers of that century, rehabilitated a non-Greek, but a Roman form
of politics, in particular the figure of the Roman censor. The normative action of the censor derived
exclusively from his administrative practice. His decisions did not imply punishments, but forms of
downgrading. The effectiveness of his activity mostly lied in provoking ‘blushing’ – ruborem is the
Latin word used by Cicero. This form of normativity became more and more important as states
developed statistics and other methodologies for the government of their populations.
The Social Credit System is not so different from what Bodin had in mind. It is the same matter of
developing and practising a normativity, whose strength is not that of the law, but rather of a mode of
quantification that better adheres to the reality and whose force depends precisely on this adherence. It
is a more granular kind of normativity; whose main goal is to occupy the empty room for manoeuvring
that the law is incapable of occupying. The Social Credit System does not aim (at least, not primarily)
to punish individuals but to bring them to the self-correction and the self-control over their habits,
behaviours, and actions. Its ultimate scope is to intervene where the law cannot, that is, in the diffused
corruption of the mores that afflict contemporary Chinese society.
The techniques and technologies at disposal to the Chinese government are different from those that
states had at disposal until a few years ago. It must also be acknowledged that in the Roman tradition to
which Bodin referred, the censor was well distinguished from the legislator, while in the case of the
Social Credit System, the two regimes of normativity are merged. However, I wonder if this does not
correspond precisely to what has already happened for a long time in western democracies. We are
scandalised by the Chinese Social Credit System not because it is contrary to ‘our’ political tradition,
but because it brings forward the grey zone about which we usually prefer to delude ourselves.
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The Citizen, the Tyrant, and the Tyranny of Patterns
Costica Dumbrava*
I agree with Wessel Reijers that social scoring systems limit political freedom and instrumentalise
citizenship to impose social control. While technologies have always been used for political ends, the
latest technologies relying on big data and complex algorithms offer uniquely powerful and highly
effective tools to survey people, quash dissent, and reinforce an authoritarian rule. What is new is a wide
appeal of technologies as ‘fixes’ for pressing social and political issues. Building on their ‘success’ in
commercial sectors (banking and marketing), predictive algorithms and scoring systems are
enthusiastically adopted by governmental agencies throughout the world to help making decisions in
areas such as criminal justice, welfare, and border control. The Chinese Social Credit scheme is
nevertheless unique because of its ambition to aggregate data from a wide variety of sources to provide
a set of prescriptive algorithms for ‘good citizenship’ that is backed by state coercion.
Good citizenship cannot be captured or fixed by an algorithm, because: (1) people genuinely disagree
about what good citizenship is; (2) there are limits to how any conception of good citizenship can be
enforced in states that uphold the rule-of-law; and (3) even the best scheme of algorithmic citizenship
would fail to achieve its objectives due to the inherent weaknesses of applying algorithms to social
affairs.

Algorithms vs Citizenship
Firstly, there are presumably as many conceptions of good citizenship as there are citizens. Some focus
on rights, others on duties; some emphasise a shared history or a sense of belonging, yet others point to
civility, solidarity, sacrifice, etc. Any attempt to design a citizenship algorithm will have to deal with
this pluralism, either by settling on a minimalistic and generic version of citizenship (making a rather
toothless algorithm) or by prioritising certain views over others (through democratic processes or not).
Secondly, it is one thing to figure out what good citizenship is and another thing to establish what
citizens should be required to do, believe, or express following such conception. Helping your neighbour
instead of binging on alcohol might be the more celebrated behaviour in many conceptions of
citizenship, but, unless explicit laws are proscribing such behaviours, the state should not penalise
people for not helping neighbours and/or for alcohol binging. Using state coercion to enforce moral
norms and social expectation, as the Chinese scheme seems to do, unwarrantedly transgresses the
boundary between legality and morality. The Chinese citizens’ scores are built by aggregating and
inferring from a wide variety of data (such as online shopping data, use of services, administrative,
financial and educational records, social media activity) without a public (open to contestation)
explanation about why any of this data is relevant and/or how the inferences work.
Thirdly, assuming that we agree on a normatively acceptable scheme of algorithmic citizenship, the
success will depend on its capability to represent and make sense of complex social issues. This criticism
concerns algorithms more broadly but might be particularly relevant for the Chinese social scoring
scheme given its lack of transparency and accountability. There is growing evidence about widespread
bias and discrimination in algorithms applied in social contexts (e.g., policing, sentencing, hiring) 1. The
bias is partly due to the dirtiness of data, a problem that is particularly acute in the case of ‘social’ data,
which is often (self)reported or recorded by people and thus, inevitably, contains errors, inaccuracies,
inconsistencies, or simply untruthful information. Yet, a bigger problem with algorithms is that they are
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bad at dealing with social and normative issues. While big-data algorithms could be useful in physical
science (as in, say, inferring physical attributes of stars using data-driven models2), they are problematic
when it comes to ‘understanding’ the social world, deliver social justice, and foster good citizenship.
Even if we fix the many problems raised by applying algorithms in social affairs (dirty data, end of
privacy, black-box algorithms, unreasonable inferences, etc.), we are still left with what I call the
problem of the tyranny of patterns. This problem comes in two parts.

Tyrannies of the Past and the Similar
The first part is the tyranny of the past, which means that algorithms are used to assign risks based on
past behaviours and social facts. Briefly, this locks individuals into patterned categories that deny them
the capacity to redeem themselves and act freely. You may have a crime-stricken from your criminal
record, but you may never be able to hide from previously recorded data about your social background,
place of birth, and education. The second part of the problem relates to the tyranny of the similar.
Algorithmic assessments of a person are not only based on data about their past, but also on data about
other individuals and their past, who are deemed similar in some statistical way to the person in question.
One may, therefore, be treated as a risky or trustworthy individual, and thus be barred or awarded access
to certain resources and opportunities, because of who her fellow ‘similars’ are and how they behave.
Algorithmic bias and unfairness are not just technical issues that could be fixed by more and better data
or by sharper algorithms; it is a ‘mathematical certainty’3, given that they mirror the real world, which
is itself biased and unfair. It is thus highly misguided to entrust algorithms (and people behind them)
with the task of fixing citizenship and building more just societies.
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Putting ‘Good Citizens’ in ‘The Good Place’?
Jiahong Chen*
Debates over the Chinese Social Credit System frequently end up with either utopian or dystopian
scenarios. While the western media often present the image of an Orwellian totalitarian future1, the
system is sometimes considered an innovative way of social governance2. In this contribution, I aim to
answer the question as to whether a Social Credit System will be more likely to lead a society to a
‘digital republic’ or a ‘digital dictatorship’. After analysing how the Chinese Social Credit System
exhibits an enormous gap between policymaking and policy-execution, I argue that instead of a utopia
or dystopia, such a system is more likely to lead us to a future of ‘digital bureaucracy’.

List-Based Measures vs Score-Based Measures
Other contributors are aware that, despite the important uniqueness of the Chinese Social Credit System,
the discussion should be kept more generally on the desirability of a Social Credit System. As Siems
and Mac Dithigh have pointed out, the Chinese Social Credit System takes three different forms in
practice: nationwide blacklists, compliance scores in pilot cities, and social credit scores by financial
institutions. Both Reijers and Van’t Klooster have chosen a more ‘score-based’ definition of a Social
Credit System. Such a score-based image of a Social Credit System is probably also fuelled by the
popularity of the Black Mirror episode ‘Nosedive’, where everyone is assigned a social rating.
Certain practices under the umbrella notion of 'Social Credit System' must be distinguished, as they
might have a significantly different impact on individuals and be subject to very different practical or
theoretical justifications. For example, China’s most oft-cited social credit policy documents – the 2014
Outline3 and the 2016 Opinion4 – do not include measures involving a ‘score’ or ‘rating’. Rather, both
documents are overwhelmingly dominated by list-based measures, i.e., blacklists for trust breakers, and
‘red’-lists for trust keepers. This is also the case for Shanghai’s Social Credit Ordinance 2017.
The prevalence of list-based approaches results largely from the fact it was the Supreme Court who
introduced some of the first initiatives to deal with disobedience of court decisions. In the absence of
individual insolvency law (and contempt of court law) in China, it has always been a challenge for courts
to enforce judgments in civil cases effectively. In response, the Supreme Court decided to publish a list
of those who wilfully refuse to obey court decisions (as a reputational punishment) and to restrict their
access to certain services (akin to bankruptcy restrictions), which turns out to be rather effective. This
partly explains why most of these initiatives did not meet much resistance – or were even welcome by
the public5 – in the first place.
This is not to say, however, that these measures are intrinsically desirable, or that they are essentially
different from the score-based measures. Yet, the relatively higher acceptability of these measures
mirrors certain important features among different approaches to a Social Credit System. A blacklist
released by courts may arguably be less worrisome in that it is subject to judicial control, applies only
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to serious and wilful disobedience, and does not involve opaque or arbitrary algorithms. These claims
are open to challenges, but the point is that certain practices falling within the scope of a Social Credit
System are not necessarily unjustifiable, or at least not far from mechanisms that are commonly accepted
across various jurisdictions6. The less discussed downside of a Social Credit System is its natural
propensity to be exploited for bureaucratic purposes.

Policy on Paper vs Policy in Reality
One of the reasons why a Social Credit System is susceptible to bureaucratic abuses lies in its potential
to be repurposed, which is what has happened in China. While the two key policy documents have not
mandated score-based measures, such approaches are embraced by local authorities. In fact, it is welldocumented that a large number of Chinese cities are already experimenting with a variety of schemes
whereby local residents are treated differently based on their social credit scores7. These schemes
concern matters ranging from the right to relocate to a megacity to prioritised access to public services.
Points can be gained or lost through a wide spectrum of behaviour, including volunteering or blood
donation, something certainly not covered by the 2014 Outline or the 2016 Opinion, but implemented
in the name of ‘contributing to the construction of the Social Credit System’.
Therefore, a crucial point to raise is that, regardless of the arguably good intention and reasonable
design of the overarching system, the mere fact that local or sectoral enforcers may easily distort such
schemes will on its own warrant serious precaution. The ‘function creep’ of the Chinese Social Credit
System is a case in point: the list-based approach targeting punishable behaviour as advanced by the
central policies has ended up as a score-based, local implementation that encourages ‘desirable’
behaviour.
One might argue such abuse has less to do with the system itself, but more with who controls the
system and what constraints are put in place – the ‘regulatory environment’ in Siems and Mac Sitigh’s
words. Indeed, under a totalitarian regime, a Social Credit System will be readily available for
suppressing dissidents. However, even in a democratic society, there remains a high risk of such a
system being repurposed for a fully legitimate policy goal. The criteria of what should be rewarded and
what should be punished under a Social Credit System may be exploited to serve a new policy objective
that is not necessarily related to the ‘social creditworthiness’ of an individual. For example, a local
government may decide to encourage the consumption of local products by incentivising such purchase
with credit points. While it is debatable whether such practice is justifiable, it shows how a Social Credit
System, irrespective of the government it serves, is bound to create a strong motivation for bureaucrats
to expand the scope of the system to areas without democratic debates or scrutiny.

Fairness vs Efficiency
Even if the Social Credit Systems are tightly restricted to certain areas, they would nevertheless be
subject to a more fundamental criticism in relation to the theoretical and practical limitations of rational
control over individual behaviour. Along with the rise of modern bureaucracy, this challenge arises from
the long-standing debate in political philosophy over the extent to which collective efficiency should be
prioritised over individuality. The ratings of individuals may be employed as a ‘convenient’ or ‘efficient’
way of allocating scarce resources by the government. In cities where social housing is in shortage, for
example, local councils may decide to give priority to those with higher scores as it would be easier for
them than assessing the degree of individual needs on a case-by-case basis. While this is still better than
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price mechanisms (Van’t Klooster), it is not necessarily fairer than the ‘old-fashioned’ model that
involves qualitative human judgment.
The functioning of a Social Credit System carries characteristics of a bureaucratic regime: (1)
rationalisation and optimisation of efficiency (quantitative evaluation and influence of behaviour of
citizen); (2) specialisation and division of labour (credit recorders, calculators, enforcers and auditors
from different sectors); (3) clear formal rules and limited discretion (criteria of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’
behaviour); and (4) impersonality (insensitivity to individual circumstances). The term ‘bureaucracy’ is
used in a neutral sense and does not necessarily carry any desirable or undesirable connotations. That
said, bureaucracy enabled by a Social Credit System would likely have some unintended consequences,
such as the scenario of ‘computer says no’, where citizens are denied services or resources when
personal situations are not taken into account. The mundanity of the activities covered by such a system
and the potential diffusion of responsibilities would also subject a Social Credit System to further
criticisms.
The next question would be, are these characteristics essential to the concept of a Social Credit
System, or are they simply the results of the (ab)uses of such a system? While I agree with other
contributors that the actual effectiveness and harm of a Social Credit System would depend on the
regulatory environment (Siems and Mac Sitigh), a Social Credit System, as a social engineering project,
brings forth changes in technological configurations and power dynamics by altering the regulability8
of individual behaviour. Such potentials are independent of the conditions of the regulatory environment
and should not be dismissed. A Social Credit System may serve a totalitarian regime or a democratic
one, but either way, it will bring existing bureaucracy to another level.

Conclusion: The Good Place and the Future of Bureaucracy
A Social Credit System faces two primary challenges regardless of the regulatory environment: first, it
is prone to unchecked expansion of scope by bureaucrats; second, it strengthens the bureaucratic
propensity pre-existing in a society. In answering the question of the debate – whether Social Credit
Systems will lead to a ‘digital republic’ or a ‘digital dictatorship’ – one would have first to answer the
question whether an ultimate bureaucratic society could be considered a utopia or a dystopia. To me, it
could go either way, depending on the role of bureaucracy in that society. For a hypothetical society
sitting perfectly between a republic and a dictatorship, a Social Credit System is most likely to reinforce
bureaucracy – amplifying its merits, and also its flaws. The characteristics of a Social Credit Systems
raised above – the tendency to be transferred for an incompatible policy objective or simply employed
for administrative efficiency – are unlikely to drive the society to a utopian future but, at the same time,
they will not necessarily lead the society closer to a totalitarian future, either.
While the idea of the Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ certainly captures dangers of a Social Credit System,
a better metaphor seems to be the world of The Good Place, where one’s afterlife will end up in ‘The
Good Place’ or ‘The Bad Place’ based on the accumulated ‘absolute moral worth’ of their every single
action, and the value of an ‘undefined action’ to be decided by a relevant department. Rather than a
digital republic or a digital dictatorship, a Social Credit System is more likely to lead to a ‘digital
bureaucracy’, a future where social credits are produced and consumed as a way of social indifference
(rather than social suppression) imposed on individualism. On the macro-level, Social Credit Systems
might be intended to make ‘good citizens’ (Reijers) – whether for the right or wrong reasons – but, on
the micro-level, they might be executed to make it easier for bureaucrats to make mundane decisions of
who should go to ‘The Good Place’, and who should go to ‘The Bad Place’.
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The Social Credit System as a New Regulatory Approach:
From ‘Code-Based’ to ‘Market-Based’ Regulation
Primavera de Filippi*
In 2014, China’s State Council issued a notice for the establishment of a nationwide Social Credit
System (SCS) by 2020. Thus far, 43 municipalities have been experimenting with a local
implementation of the SCS – each with their own distinctive characteristics. Despite the different
approaches adopted by various municipalities, the common denominator is that all pilots are designed
to promote trustworthy behaviour by creating incentives to comply with social norms and economic
obligations. Traditional institutions and social structures have been unable to catch up with the rapid
pace of China’s economic development over the past years. This led to the establishment of an advanced
market economy, characterised by an underdeveloped institutional and social framework, with local
markets filled with counterfeited goods, scams and fraudulent activities, as individuals are becoming
more individualistic and self-serving. As a result, the level of interpersonal trust in China has radically
dropped, creating widespread discontent among citizens. The SCS is an attempt by the government to
restore trust in people and society, by leveraging digital tools in order to govern society better and more
effectively.
By collecting data about individual activities, online and offline, China relies on big data analytics
to profile citizens into specific categories, depending on their attributes and past actions. Every
municipal pilot has identified a series of desirable or undesirable actions, each associated with a
particular payoff structure (either positive or negative). Desirable actions are rewarded with a high social
credit score, resulting in a particular privilege or compensation, whereas undesired actions are punished,
via blacklists or lower social score, resulting in a loss of privileges or economic sanctions. As such, the
SCS can be regarded as an alternative form of regulation, which is not driven by law, but rather by a set
of incentivization mechanisms powered by market dynamics and social norms.
In 1999, Harvard professor Lawrence Lessig identified four different forces that can be used to
regulate individuals: law, social norms, markets, and architecture (i.e., technical infrastructure or code).
Lessig underlined the fact that we cannot focus solely on legal rules to understand the forces that govern
or influence individual behaviours; we must take instead a more systematic approach that properly
accounts for the relative influence of each of these different levers. Against this background, the SCS
presents a shift away from the law towards a new approach to regulation, which essentially consists of
code (responsible for collecting data and translating it into a social score) combined with market
dynamics (i.e., a series of economic incentives or disincentives to act in a particular manner) and social
norms (as a result of status, privileges, and social pressure to increase one’s social score).

On the Democratic Legitimacy of the SCS
To what extent does the SCS comply with the fundamental principles of democratic legal systems and
human rights values?
First, because it operates independently of (or as a complement to) the legal system, the SCS can
cover activities that are generally left outside of the legal scope. As argued by van ’t Klooster, the SCS
can promote behaviours that are not mandatory, but nonetheless desirable, while condemning activities
that are not illegal per se and yet considered potentially harmful. For instance, in China, some of the
SCS pilots are designed to punish citizens by reducing their credit score not only as a result of legal
offences and misdemeanours, but also in response to lawful activities such as purchasing too much junk
food or video games, which are not forbidden by law. Similarly, with regard to the incentivization
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mechanisms, while it would be difficult to legally require citizens to perform certain types of activities
(such as buying Chinese products or visiting elders more frequently1), the SCS incentivizes them in this
direction by rewarding citizens with a higher score.
As opposed to traditional legal rules, the SCS provides greater granularity on the types of behaviours
that can be incentivized or disincentivized, ‘occupying the empty room for manoeuvring that the law is
incapable to occupy’, as Romele has shown. By stipulating different types of rewards or punishments
on activities that are not strictly speaking regulated under the law, the SCS operates where the law is
unable to intervene – introducing a new type of normativity, based on metrics, quantification and
statistical analysis2 (Berns, 2009) that has progressively infiltrated the legal and political system,
rewarding or condemning individual behaviours independently of whether they are legal or illegal, or
even right or wrong. The SCS, as underlined by Dumbrava, thus ‘unwarrantedly transgresses the
boundary between legality and morality’.
Second, because it does not rely on existing laws and regulation, the SCS is also not subject to the
same type of constraints as the legal system. Traditionally, in most western or democratic societies, any
legal system is subject to a series of substantive and procedural constraints, including the need for
generality, publicity and predictability of rules, as well as the requirements of equitable judgement, due
process, separation of powers, or the respect of private property and individual liberty3. Hence, China’s
SCS stands in contrast with the democratic concept of the rule of law – geared towards the separation
of law and politics - and rather implements a rule by law – whereby law is used as a tool to command
and discipline people, as it is generally done in authoritarian regimes. True, the SCS may theoretically
comply with the rule of law. Yet, as highlighted by Ford, its current implementation in the various
regions of China is more likely to run contrary to the basic premises of the rule of law and may even
violate fundamental human rights values.
One important issue with these systems is that citizens can be punished multiple times for the same
wrong because a lower social score could impact many different facets of their lives. For instance,
individuals with lower social credit scores might simultaneously lose the privilege to obtain a visa,
purchase property and secure a mortgage or a loan; they might be prevented from buying tickets for
high-speed trains or air travel, booking hotel rooms, or even from enrolling their children in a good
private school – all at the same time4. This aspect is often presented as a feature of the SCS, with the
oft-touted slogan that ‘whoever violates the rules somewhere shall be restricted everywhere’. Yet, this
aspect goes counter to one of the basic principles of the rule of law, according to which no individual
should be punished twice for the same offence.
Moreover, because the consequences of an individual’s social credit score are automatically defined
and directly enforceable within the information system of the relevant authorities (e.g., a public
administration, but also private actors like banks, transportation companies, or schools) with whom that
individual interacts, the rules enshrined in the SCS are directly applicable without the need for any thirdparty enforcement authority. And because there is no specific procedure for appeals, individuals who
believe in having been unfairly punished or wrongly blacklisted by the system are left with little to no
recourse. This runs counter to several rule-of-law principles, including ‘separation of power’, ‘due
process’ and ‘presumption of innocence’ – all designed to limit potential abuses of power by one
governing authority over its citizens.
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On the Efficiency of the SCS
With the stated purpose of instilling societal trust, by incentivizing citizens to act virtuously while
penalizing them for socially undesirable behaviour, the SCS is perhaps one of the most ambitious
attempts by a government at producing ideal citizens. To what extent can the SCS fulfil these underlying
objectives, and what is the overall efficiency of the system?
One reason why the SCS may be deemed to produce better citizens than a capitalist market economy
is that, as shown by van ’t Klooster, markets often fail to properly reward good citizens who work all
their lives diligently and follow the rules; but rather reward those who accumulate scarce resources and
use these resources to accumulate more capital. The market system is geared towards productive and
allocative efficiency and does not optimize towards morality or values. The SCS is thus presented as a
better alternative to the market economy because it rewards citizens based on their social and political
behaviours.
Yet, to the extent that it is possible to accumulate social credit, it is difficult to force people to always
act virtuously (as Reijers puts it) provided that they have a sufficiently high credit score that they can
afford acting in a harmful manner. Hence, while the SCS might require some people to act virtuously in
some cases, it does not necessarily ‘make’ them virtuous. On the contrary, one could fairly argue that
the SCS might introduce a new type of transactionality in the realm of social and political activities,
whereby an individual may feel legitimised to act wrongly, provided that he or she has performed a
sufficient number of good deeds in the past, so as to discount for the lower score.
Moreover, in addition to encourage or discourage specific behaviours by economic incentives, the
SCS also rely on social pressure to regulate individual behaviour. In China, there have been rumours
that some of the SCS pilots have implemented a system whereby people may see their social credit score
drop by the mere fact of interacting with the wrong person, online or offline5. This is likely to lead to an
outright marginalization of all those who do not act according to the ‘social canon’. The reverse is also
possible. While some implementations of the SCS have been using individuals’ social network activities
as a way of potentially reducing their score, other implementations – such as Alibaba’s Zhima (Sesame)
Credit – have been designed to increase the social credit score of people interacting with other highscored individuals6. These systems bring the risk of replicating the capitalistic dynamics of the market
economy, whereby people who accumulate social credit could leverage it to obtain even more social
credit. This could pave the way for the establishment of a new society of ‘elites’ in which a small number
of high-ranked rule-abiding individuals would only interact with other high-ranked rule-abiding
individuals.
Another interesting point relates to how the SCS might ultimately legitimize a national surveillance
system. In order to properly function, any SCS will require the collection of a vast amount of information
about citizens, which might raise important privacy concerns. Yet, most Chinese citizens are drawn to
the SCS7 because it allows them to show to the government (and others) that they are ‘good citizens’, in
addition to the economic or non-economic privileges they can gain. Because of these benefits, people
are keen to participate to the SCS – often without questioning the source or legitimacy of the rules it
enshrines – and thus willingly disclose information about their daily activities to private or governmental
actors even if that comes at the expense of privacy. Even people who might be reluctant to give up their
privacy are left with little to no choice. Indeed, individuals who try to mask their activities in order to
protect their privacy will ultimately be at a disadvantage, since they will not be rewarded for being good
citizens. Perhaps most importantly, the mere fact of not disclosing information, rather than being
regarded as a legitimate choice motivated by a desire to preserve one’s privacy, could instead qualify as
5
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an indicator that a person is, in fact, not a good citizen. The metrics results thus inverted: ‘I’m a good
citizen, because I have a good credit score’ has replaced the previous ‘I have a good credit score, because
I am a good citizen’.
Finally, as described by Reijers, the SCS does not contribute to creating more virtuous citizens,
because it does not allow them to choose to act virtuously, but rather prescribes them how to do so. This
leads to a rationalisation and actual objectivization of what it means to be a good citizen. People no
longer need to exercise their own judgement as to how to act; they just need to follow the rules stipulated
for them – thereby preventing them from distinguishing themselves in the public sphere8. As a result,
people no longer have the opportunity to think for themselves about what is right or wrong. Rather than
taking the risk of acting in a way that the SCS will consider to be an undesirable action, they can simply
delegate part of their morality to the system.

On the Terror of Metrics
An additional problem relates to the difference between laws and metrics. Laws are general rules that
stipulate what shall or shall not be done. Given the inherent ambiguity and flexibility of natural
language, laws need to be appreciated by a judge in light of specific facts before they can be applied to
the particular case at hand. Instead, the SCS relies on a set of strict and specific rules (i.e., codified
metrics) that can be automatically processed by a machine. Because they do not account for specific
facts, metrics are mostly concerned with the ends, independently of the means used to achieve these
ends.
With no opportunity for human appreciation, the SCS merely codify rules into a particular set of
metrics, with no account for the underlying values that motivated the establishment of these rules.
Citizens’ most rational behaviour would, therefore, be to focus only on improving the metrics, rather
than acting in line with what these metrics were originally intended to be an indicator of. While it might
be true that – as famously said by Peter Drucker – ‘what you cannot measure, you cannot improve’, one
should also not forget that the mere establishment of a particular metrics-based system might introduce
a significant bias in behaviour, so that ‘only what you can measure will improve’. Citizens might thus
be tempted to only engage in activities that will boost their social credit, regardless of the virtue or
morality of these actions. If the metrics are poorly defined, individuals might even be rewarded for doing
something immoral (e.g., lying to their peers – an action currently bearing no punishment in terms of
social scoring) to improve their chances of being selected for community services or other rewarded
activity. Ultimately, because the system can only account for a limited amount of information, and data
fed into the system is necessarily incomplete, the SCS might generate unfair outcomes by lack of
contextual information on the why and the how of a citizen’s individual behaviour. As any metrics-based
system, the ends will always justify the means.

.
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Is a Social Credit System Good for Women?
Mirjam Müller*
In 2015 a group of feminists created the hashtag #GiveYourMoneyToWomen. The idea was to draw
attention to the time and energy that women spend on providing uncompensated emotional care for men.
As such, #GiveYourMoneyToWomen critiqued how goods, which are typically associated with women,
such as compassion, empathy or moral attention, are often taken for granted and not adequately valued.
Gender-stereotypical assumptions about women’s natural disposition and desire to care hide the time
and energy that caregiving typically involves. In a capitalist economy, the value of goods tends to be
tied to their exchange value. By turning private caregiving into a marketable good, this feminist
intervention aimed to make it visible, as something that needs to be valued.
However, there are reasons to be sceptical about turning caregiving into a marketable good. Imagine
that for every five minutes of listening to a friend’s worry, we would start cashing in. Rather than
integrating caregiving into the price-mechanism, wouldn’t it be more attractive to find different ways in
which it could be valued? It is at this point that a Social Credit System becomes interesting. In this
blogpost, I explore potential implications of a Social Credit System for gender equality. The claim is
this: a Social Credit System is, in principle, able to integrate a wider set of behaviours and characteristics
that merit reward than the price mechanism. It could hence turn out to be better at valuing femininecoded tasks, such as care-work. Yet, I argue, feminists should be sceptical with regards to the
emancipatory potential of a Social Credit System, as such a system might turn out to reproduce dominant
forms of valuing rather than promoting real change.

Social Credit Systems: How Do They Work?
Following other contributors in the blog (e.g., Reijers or van ’t Klooster), I understand a Social Credit
System (SCS) as a centralised system of governance that uses surveillance techniques of the state and/or
private entities to (1) trace multiple observable behaviours of citizens, (2) assign scores based on these
behaviours, and (3) reward individuals with high ratings and punishes those with low ratings. As other
contributors to this debate have pointed out, a SCS does not merely punish or reward citizens based on
the lawfulness of their actions. Instead, it also evaluates the morality or social desirability of their
actions. For instance, a person’s score can go down as a result of parking in a non-parking area, getting
a divorce, or failing to repay a loan. Low credit scores can lead to sanctions ranging from being blocked
from a dating website to being banned from long-distance flights. As such, the SCS tracks a broad range
of actions in order to incentivise socially desirable behaviours and character traits in citizens. The exact
way in which a SCS is designed and implemented is highly context dependent. Yet, I want to abstract
from any specific SCS and instead focus on the potential of such a system to contribute to gender
equality.

Emancipatory Potential of a Social Credit System?
In his contribution to the debate, Jens van ’t Klooster has argued that a SCS is potentially better at
realising distributive justice than a price mechanism. As a SCS is sensitive to a wider range of actions
and behaviours that merit reward, using social credit ratings to distribute benefits and burdens might be
fairer than relying on the price mechanism. If the SCS does fare better in rewarding a wider range of
behaviours and personal traits than a price mechanism does, this could be good news for feminists: tasks
that are distributed along gendered lines could be valued differently if they are rewarded in the social
credit scheme. For instance, in one of the local social credit schemes in China, purchasing diapers for a
*

Postdoctoral Fellow, Justitia Amplificata, Free University Berlin.

European University Institute

29

Edited by Liav Orgad and Wessel Reijers

child increases the social credit score1. Consequently, there is a potential that feminine-coded tasks that
often go unnoticed, such as child-care, will become more visible and differently valued as a result. This,
in turn, could have significant effects on how stereotypically female tasks are valued and understood
more broadly.
There are, however, reasons to be sceptical.

Why a Social Credit System is Not (Necessarily) Good for Women
While a SCS can assign value to a wider range of behaviours and personal traits than the pricemechanism, it is unclear whether this, in and of itself, will promote feminist values. Following Elizabeth
Anderson, what and how people value is tied to the social relations within which they stand2. Whether
or not we ascribe value to certain goods is not independent of how these goods are produced, distributed,
and used. For instance, the gendered division of labour according to which women bear primary childcare responsibilities entails specific modes of valuation, such as thinking about child-care as a ‘labour
of love’.
In a patriarchal society, what it means to be a ‘good citizen’ and, consequently, which behaviours
and character traits are rewarded will be guided by dominant norms about gender and the institutions
upholding these norms. If we think about values in this way, it becomes questionable whether, and to
what extent, a SCS will significantly change our ways of valuing and increase the value of behaviours
that so far fall outside the price mechanism. Rewarding tasks that often go unnoticed, such as buying
diapers, might have effects on how people value more broadly. Yet, the extent to which a SCS will be
able to change valuing practices to increase gender equality will depend on (at least) two conditions.
First, whether or not a SCS may affect valuing practices more broadly will depend on how open
existing social practices are with regards to integrating new values and revising existing ones. Think
again about the practice of caregiving. Assigning a social credit score to feminine-coded goods, such as
emotional support or empathy, does not necessarily lead to a higher valuation of these goods or a change
in the practice of caregiving more generally. For instance, taking care of a relative might increase
someone’s credit score. Yet, if nothing changes with regards to the division of labour, and hence if
women continue to be the primary caretakers, the way in which these tasks are valued might merely take
a different form. Visibility does not automatically lead to appreciation if there is no change in the
underlying practices. Consequently, if human values are dependent on the social practices within which
they are embedded, a change in values requires a change in social practice.
Second, it matters crucially how the catalogue of behaviours and character traits that merit
reward/punishment is created and, especially, who gets a say in what it entails. In that sense, it will
matter, who can give input with regards to which behaviours constitute a ‘good citizen’. Suppose only
certain groups of people, e.g., those that are already dominant in a given society, such as white men, are
asked what they consider to be desirable behaviours or character traits. In that case, the catalogue might
reproduce dominant forms of valuing. Contrary to that, if a wider group of people in different social
positions gets a say in what should or should not go on the list, chances are that marginalised experiences
will become more visible and, as a result, might be valued differently. Consequently, the extent to which
a SCS can transform the way of valuing in a given society will also depend on how different voices are
integrated into the process of determining which behaviours or character traits are socially desirable.
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In sum, whether a SCS can promote feminist valuing practices will depend on how rigid the social
practices within which it is embedded are and, importantly, who gets a say in determining which values
matter. Therefore, feminists should not put too much hope on a SCS to change how feminine-coded
tasks are valued. Instead, they should continue to fight for changing the social practices within which
values are embedded. If a Social Credit System can be designed and implemented in a way that it
provides resources for that purpose, even better.

European University Institute

31

Edited by Liav Orgad and Wessel Reijers

Data Diets and Democracy: The Chinese Social Credit System
From a Machine Learning Perspective
Joshua Fairfield*
Introduction
The current debate asks whether the set of technologies that make up the Chinese Social Credit System
(SCS) trends towards a digital dictatorship or a digital republic. I make two points. First, Chinese AI
may well become stronger than western AI because of differences in the data available to train machine
learning algorithms. Second, the mechanisms of machine learning may tend towards a reversal of the
long-standing advantages of information decentralisation in capitalist economies, with negative knockon effects for liberal democracies worldwide.
My conclusions: the SCS trends against democracy. It is being built by a competent and motivated
anti-democratic system with social control as one stated goal. The more important question though is
whether the Chinese machine learning data diet will make Chinese AI stronger than western AI, and
whether the realities of machine learning will undermine western-style capitalism and liberal
democracy. As this essay argues, I think there is a real chance that both will occur.
These conclusions place the current piece in both agreement with and at odds with the framing
arguments for this debate. Both Reijers and van ‘t Klooster move from talking about the SCS to a
discussion of a SCS. That move is correct in that the surface question of whether the Chinese version of
these systems will be turned to anti-democratic ends is not particularly interesting. But machine learning
algorithms cannot be divorced from the data they study - data produced by citizens in a given context.
Thus, I place the machine learning algorithms back into context by talking about the role that citizenproduced data plays in training machine learning algorithms. For three reasons, discussed below,
Chinese machine learning algorithms may benefit from more and more varied data than do western
versions and this, in turn, may impact the underpinnings of capitalism and democracy worldwide.

The Chinese Data Diet
The key to machine learning is data—its volume, completeness, and variety. Recent advances in
algorithm design have been merely (or mostly) advances in the amount, variety, and quality of the data
that is able to feed machine learning algorithms. To the extent that the SCS represents something
different from the emerging western system of artificial-intelligence-driven pricing (of credit as of any
other commodity or service), the differences will need to lie in the data channelled into these systems,
and the differences that the AI will learn on a different data diet.
I then leave the reader with some musing about what it would mean if the SCS and similar systems
generate superior machine learning results because of improved access to datasets, amount of data, and
the new on-ramps created by the physical systems of the SCS (neighbour reporting and the like) 1. In
particular, I suggest a dangerous potential overturning of a longstanding principle of capitalist
development. Capitalism in its late-20th-century idiom has succeeded largely because decentralised
information processing is far more efficient than is centralised data processing. The ‘Invisible Hand’ of
the market is a metaphor for the coordinating actions of decentralised economic decisionmakers, who
organise production around price points, for example. The question is whether the strong synergies of
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centralisation inherent in machine learning will undermine this economic consensus, and thus undermine
liberal democracies in general.
Machine learning and related technologies consist of a range of techniques, the full scope of which
is outside the reach of this article. One shift, however, is worth mentioning. Many of the algorithms we
rely upon have existed with minor updates for several decades. What changed in the early 21st century
is that the raw volume of data available to train machine learning algorithms exploded.
Data matters because, for at least many of the most common and most effective machine learning
programs, the machine does not understand anything. Rather, it finds connections in data by looking at
a lot of it. Machine learning algorithms rely on correlations in the data that are relevant to the prediction
the algorithm is trying to make. The more data a machine learning algorithm can ingest, the more
correlations it can find. If one’s concern is pure accuracy and not explainability, the weights used by a
machine learning program can be quite extensive: perhaps my political reliability or creditworthiness
correlates with my social media contacts, recent purchases, books read, social media commentary,
outcomes of judicial processes, and so on. Each correlation may yield information gain, which will help
in making a better selection.
The difference in the machine learning algorithms created for advertisement, election influence, and
creditworthiness in the West and those that result from the SCS - if there are important and salient
differences - can be usefully explained in terms of the differences in data diet that the SCS system
affords. This point has gone underexplored in the debate. The following parts discuss how the SCS
might differ from the western machine learning context in terms of access to data, amount of data, and
physical on-ramping.

Access to Data
Data in the United States and Europe is often kept separate from other data pools2. This is usually for
reasons more of competition than privacy. Facebook’s knowledge of its users is its goldmine; likewise,
Google’s tracking of users as they interact with websites across the internet. A machine learning
algorithm that had access to the combined Facebook and Google datasets would be able to extract out
features and would undoubtedly be more accurate than one based on either browser-tracking or social
media interactions alone. Unintentionally, this offers some protection against machine learning
algorithms. The question is whether the Chinese political structure offers avenues for combining datasets
that western countries do not.
First, the Chinese government has a stronger hand in the information industry than do western
governments3. This government whip-hand sometimes merely increases raw government power, for
example, in the form of country-wide censorship mandated by the government and carried out by
industry4. Second, the Chinese government’s overt encouragement of the SCS overlaps with its public
commitment and large investment in artificial intelligence5. In addition, powerful consortia vie for the
political and commercial capital at play. My view is that there is ample cause to believe that these
political considerations may cause Chinese AI to benefit from larger and more varied datasets than do
those trained by individual U.S. companies, no matter how large.
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Amount of Data
The key question is whether the Chinese legal, cultural, and technological frameworks permit access to
more, different, and more granular data. More data is easy to imagine but hard to confirm. The
population numbers are higher: some estimates put the number of mobile internet users in China at more
than double the entire United States population6. That is a lot of smartphones recording a lot of data,
which can be used for targeted behavioural advertising, political verification, and so forth.
However, overlapping data is often less useful than different datasets. Data about you as you surf the
web is even more helpful when combined with data from your smartphone geolocator, or your smart
television’s parsing of your conversations and viewing habits. This is called sensor fusion: combining
multiple datasets often results in information beyond their sum. Sensor fusion has a greater impact in
deeply gadgeted societies. I am aware of no study on comparative western-Chinese sensor fusion. Such
a study would prove deeply informative on the relative strengths and weaknesses of Chinese machine
learning.

Municipal On-Ramping
The last element is whether the Chinese government support, especially in the form of model city
initiatives and the structure of bureaucratic advancement within the Chinese Communist Party, has a
strong impact on building out physical sensors, like smart cities or municipal sensors, that serve to onramp citizens data and make it available for machine learning.
I am not certain that government power and different legal and social norms surrounding privacy
make much of a difference for physical on-ramping, at least when one compares China to the United
States and the U.K. In those countries, the temptation to circumvent constitutional restrictions on
government mass surveillance by routing the data collection through third-party firms has proven
irresistible. In continental Europe, norms surrounding personal privacy in public spaces take on a
different aspect, and we might expect AI trained on sparser European data to be at some disadvantage.
Physical on-ramping, in the form of municipal cameras, pressure sensors, and other so-called ‘smart
city’ technology, seems to be developing similar amounts of coverage in China and the United States.
The mechanisms may be slightly more commercially driven in the U.S., and the government plays more
of a recipient and beneficiary of commercial datasets, which it turns to policing and intelligence
purposes, but I have no sense that the amount and flow of data across physical sensor networks is less.
My understanding is that often party advancement is tied to the furtherance of party buzz words and
goals. To the extent Social Credit is a party buzz word, we may expect municipal and regional officials
to make efforts to develop facilities for the SCS in their areas of expertise and authority. If, then, party
members who are in positions of municipal authority believe that physical on-ramping of municipal
sensor data is valuable to their political careers - as I think the evidence indicates is the case at least at
present - then we might expect data on-ramping through municipal sensors to strongly exceed at least
European rates.

Concluding Thoughts
I have raised these points because they are salient to the two fundamental questions posed by the
SCS. Those questions are political and economic (if one sees those as separate spheres). The political
element, which has attracted the most attention, is the extent to which the SCS will be profoundly antidemocratic. Since the SCS was designed by and for a non-democratic political system, this is a bit of a
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non-question. Of course, the system is being used to enforce political hygiene, and there is already more
than enough evidence of these technologies being used to monitor and oppress.
The follow-on problem is harder. AI in general, and machine learning as its most currently successful
instantiation, may destabilise the current consensus in economics that decentralised information
processes in markets, coordinated primarily by price points, are the best way to run an economic system.
It is not inconceivable that machine learning may change the playing field of capitalism. I do not suggest
that centralised AI will be able to guide a national economy better than will some form of combined
machine learning and decentralised firm-based decision-making, but I do suggest that the balance of
those contributing elements may shift decidedly.
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Scoring Systems: Levels of Abstraction
Francesca Lagioia* and Giovanni Sartor**
One of the contested issues in this debate relates to similarities and differences between scoring systems
in China and in the West – how unique is China? In this post, we will try to reconcile the different
perspectives, arguing that both commonalities and differences exist, depending on the adopted level of
abstraction. Thus, we shall zoom in the Chines Social Credit System (SCS), examining the features it
shares with other systems, and point to related issues: it is a scoring system, it is formal, it is ICT based,
it is surveillance-based, it is opaque and unaccountable. This enables us to distinguish commonalities
and differences.

Commonalities between the Chinese SCS and Other Systems
First, the Chinese SCS shares with other social rating systems the feature of assessing people based on
their skills, character, motivation, etc. Rating is, in fact, a common feature of social contexts in which it
contributes to people’s reputation. For instance, in commercial relations, merchants are rated based on
their sales-volume, quality of service and reliability, which determine their reputation – a key asset for
a successful business. Workers are rated based on their performance, attitude, and motivation; their
ratings determine employment opportunities. University teachers are rated based on student’s
assessment, publications, and papers’ citations.
Second, China’s SCS shares with other rating systems the fact of being institutionalised and
formalised: methods are defined for recording data and determining rankings, which have to be
expressed in predefined formats. Some formal scoring systems also share with the Chinese SCS the
synthetic expression of rankings through numeric values or positions in predefined scales (for instance,
this traditionally applies to students’ achievements). This enhances the possibility of assessing and
comparing individuals; each is labelled through his/her reputational values, which can be used across
different contexts and through time and have persistent objectivity. Numeric values in predefined scales
are common to several systems – from archives of criminal records to credit recordings, managed both
by humans and by automated ones.
Third, China’s SCS is ICT-based. ICT-based scoring systems present peculiar features. They enable
scores to be grounded on massive sets of data and be obtained by any kind of complex computations. In
modern societies, ICT-based scoring systems have been used in various domains: ranking job applicants,
assigning credit scores, assessing risks of recidivism, etc. ICT-based ratings present common aspects:
they persist in time, have an apparent degree of objectivity, can be accessed and communicate at a
distance, and can trigger computations.
Fourth, China’s SCS shares with other recently developed scoring systems the fact of being
surveillance based. As activities and interactions become computer-mediated, observable sources of
information can be stored, merged, and intelligently processed to assess individuals according to past
behaviour and anticipate and direct future actions. The collection of useful information is increased by
the extraction of data from the physical world through ubiquitous sensors. This leads to scoring systems
whose functioning is based on the massive collection of personal data that is automatically collected and
processed through AI technologies. Consider, for instance, how users are surveyed and scored in
services such as eBay, Uber and Airbnb.

*

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, CIRSFID, University of Bologna.

**

Professor, Department of Law, European University Institute.

36

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers

A Dystopian Future? The Rise of Social Credit Systems

Peculiarities of the Chinese SCS
After presenting the commonalities between the Chinese SCS and other SCSs, we address its
peculiarities.
A first distinctive feature of the Chinese Social Credit system, as compared to scoring systems in the
West, is that the government drives it, rather than private actors. The leading surveillance paradigm in
the West is represented indeed by private actors, acting for profit, and implementing the economic model
of the so-called ‘surveillance capitalism’, as exemplified by leading internet companies, such as Google,
Facebook and Amazon1. These companies assess and quantify the relevant attitudes and propensities of
their users, support various kinds of public rankings, interact with companies providing specialised
assessment and quantifications (e.g., in the credit or insurance domain). It is true that in western
countries scoring may be used in the public domain (e.g., assessing risks of criminal behaviour or
measuring the performance of civil servants). Examples are predictive systems to determine the risk of
recidivism, which in turn contribute to determine sentences2. Although the ‘surveillance state’ also exists
in the West – an example is the PRISM system set up by the U.S. government, which merged data
collected from private companies and telecommunications – thus far, no systems run by a government
in western countries reach the pervasiveness and intrusiveness of the Chinese SCS.
A second distinctive feature of the Chinese SCS is the fact that this system provides for a single score
based on data covering all aspects of personality. The Chinese SCS aggregates data coming from
different data platforms and collected by various private and public stakeholders into a centralised data
infrastructure, expanding the traditional commercial rating into financial, political, judicial, and social
domains. This is an important difference from the West, where surveillance systems and the
corresponding scoring models look at citizens as ‘individuals’, namely, each system focusing on a
particular face of a person (e.g., as consumer, debtor, gamer, worker, insured, patient, doctor, etc.) and
ranking individuals with regard to aspects pertinent to that faces. Thus, it seems that a fragmented
evaluation should have a lower impact on self-esteem and social ranking since each individual can
distinguish his or her identity from each sectorial scoring, the impact of each being is to the
corresponding context.
A third distinctive feature consists in the fact that the Chinese SCS aims to assess the moral and civic
merit of citizens and provide corresponding punishments and rewards. On the contrary, western systems
tend to focus on aspects related to economic performance, or risk of illegal behaviour. The single score
provided by the system tends to become an indicator of each person’s social value and can trigger effects
pertaining to all aspects of individual’s life: from work opportunities, to access to transport, and up to
health care. In such a context, individuals may react to the fact of being surveyed and scored by adapting
their behaviour to the system’s rules, that is, acting in order to avoid sanctions and gain rewards. This
may substitute and crowd out authentic moral/legal experience, reasoning and choice, which requires
the individual to address the conflict between self-interest and moral/legal requirements. In a Kantian
spirit, we may say that the exercise of morality requires the possibility of immortality, which is somehow
excluded by pervasive scoring, even when scores are effectively linked to pro-social behaviour (which
may not always be the case given economic and political imperatives). Reijers also argues that scoring
may induce conformity rather than distinction and creativity. The extent to which it is true depends on
the scoring methods: if scores are based on scalable factors (e.g., school results, response time, users’
ratings), they may incentivise excellence, though according to established criteria. On the other hand,
scoring leads to comparisons, competition, stress, and possibly to social action problems, where each
individual invests too much to get a higher rank than others (e.g., in school or work effort). Since not
everybody can excel, some will fall behind, which may lead to negative outcomes, such as dismissal or
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missed opportunities, and the loss of self-esteem and marginalisation. The difficulty of improving a
score (of rehabilitation or redemption) may lead to disinvestment and renunciation. The impact of
scoring on individual motivation, while not been limited to the Chinese SCS, is brought to the extreme
by its operation.
A fourth distinctive feature of the Chinese SCS is that it has been designed and implemented by an
authoritarian government. Though the Chinese SCS has been presented as an implementation of a model
of social virtue, inspired by the Chinese Confucian traditions, there is no warranty that it is not driven
by goals of political control. There is no institutional mechanism that may ensure that the rankings
correspond to an acceptable notion of civic virtue. The centralisation of data collection and scoring
infrastructure rules out direct influence by civil society, the absence of which enhances the information
asymmetry between state authorities and individuals; it diminishes the possibility of citizens to hold the
political power accountable by a counter-surveillance mechanism, for instance, through licensing and
audit requirements.
China’s SCS, while presenting commonalities with other scoring systems, is characterised by a
cluster of features – often extreme versions of general trends – that make it both unique and exemplary.
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Untrustworthy: Social Credit Isn’t What You Think It Is
Jeremy Daum*
Technology is redefining citizenship, governance, and individuality in China and elsewhere. We face
challenges of securing personal data, limiting collection and use of online information, and controlling
the spread of misinformation. Many of these issues may be global, but China is different. It lacks a
healthy civil society or free media to foster debate and draw attention to potential abuses, it lacks
independent courts that might review police power, and it has a government that views individual rights
as inherently subordinate to obligations to maintain social order and stability.
This means there will be fewer brakes on government experimentation with new technologies in the
pursuit of stability and order. There will be less resistance to invasive data collection, wrongful arrests
from facial recognition misidentifications, or over-inclusive profiling of potential criminals by opaque
algorithms. Stories from Xinjiang already confirm these fears1.
Despite these differences, or because of them, there can be great comparative value for democracies
in watching China’s integration of technology, governance, and society, but meaningful comparison
requires accurate understanding. Social credit should not be used as a stand-in for all Chinese
government uses of new data technology, nor should China be used solely as a foil for our fears about
technology’s creeping reach into privacy and decision-making.
In his blog post, Reijers defines the essential characteristics of a Social Credit System as including
tracking and surveillance, scoring, and gamification through rewards and punishments. He further
distinguishes ‘Social Credit Systems’ from other recordkeeping or rating schemes based both on the
breadth of inputs (including ‘a great many kinds of everyday behaviours’) and the ‘integral character’
of the output ‘score’, which creates a generalised, holistic profile assessment connecting seemingly
unrelated activities.
These criteria highlight core concerns about how information from our rapidly expanding digital
presences might be used for control by corporations and governments, but they are neither closely
derived from Chinese law nor reflective of its practice.

How Social Credit Works
Generally speaking, China’s Social Credit System includes three discrete pillars: (1) a financial credit
reporting component similar to that found in many nations, which seeks to evaluate one’s ability to repay
loans; (2) an administrative enforcement component involving a series of industry blacklists and joint
punishment agreements for those who violate laws and regulations; and (3) a moral education
component that focuses on teaching values of honesty and integrity2. While there is some overlap
between these areas (e.g., a conviction for fraud would be relevant to all three), they have different goals,
methods, and even terminologies, and thus should be considered individually.
Consider the inputs of surveillance and behaviour tracking. China is widely regarded as a surveillance
state, and its law enforcement has sweeping investigative powers with minimal external restraints. Social
credit could be said to facilitate tracking by consolidating existing information records under citizen and
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organisation identification numbers and publicly disclosing them for a limited time, but it does not really
expand the scope of government data collection. It is, instead, concerned with public, governmentcreated records, such as for administrative punishments, permits, or licenses that reflect natural persons’
and organisations’ ‘compliance with legal and contractual obligations in social and economic activity3’.
As for Reijers’ expected output of holistic scoring or ranking, neither the 5-year planning document
initiating the establishment of China’s Social Credit System nor any other higher-level social credit legal
authority mentions a social credit score. A few dozen regions have created local ‘scoring’ systems for
‘personal integrity’ (the language of the moral education component) but point deductions in these
systems result from violations of legal obligations, not an integrated behavioural assessment. Moreover,
the rewards and punishments are nominal in comparison to existing punishments for those same
violations. The criminal penalty for drunk driving, for example, is likely of more concern than that the
conviction will lower one’s score. Even the most prominent point systems have so little impact on
employment, education, and daily life that most citizens remain totally unaware of them4.
Within certain fields and industries, regulatory agencies reward consistent compliance with
facilitated and priority services (‘green channels’) while violations can result in heightened scrutiny or
restrictions. This type of ‘ranking’ is industry-specific rather than generalised to other areas, meaning a
company viewed as a compliant or non-compliant ‘food producer’ would only face the consequences in
the area of food safety regulation.
Entities with more serious violations may be blacklisted by industry authorities, which does result in
‘joint-enforcement’ penalties imposed by other regulatory bodies in unrelated fields, based on interagency agreements5. These punishments often include consideration of the blacklisting when applying
for professional credentials and licenses, and limits on bidding in government projects or receiving
public funding. Blacklisting by the FDA for selling tainted foodstuffs, for example, can impact
applications to run a securities trading business.
More exotic penalties, such as restrictions on the purchase of airplane tickets and other expensive
goods, are essentially unique to the court systems’ blacklist for those refusing to perform on valid court
judgments. The appropriate scope and legality of such restrictions, and how long they should be
enforced, remain hotly debated topics in Chinese legal circles.
In short, it is questionable whether China’s emerging Social Credit System described above would
qualify as ‘social credit’ under Reijers’ criteria of what is a Social Credit System.

A Well-Informed Citizen is a Vigilant Citizen
Posing questions about how technology can be used to shape citizens, and change what it means to be a
citizen, is of critical and immediate importance, but using China as a blank slate on which we project
hypotheticals causes more confusion than clarity. It can distract us from more pressing concerns
regarding China, technology or both.
As to China, the distraction may be direct, in shifting our focus from other crises like that in Xinjiang,
or indirect, creating confusion as to the true causes for concern about social credit. If social credit is
largely a mechanism for enforcing laws, is the real issue the enforcement or the unjust laws such as
those that limit speech? Is the real concern China’s Social Credit System, or a society perceived as so
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https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/zhengcefagui/zhengcefagui/zhongyangzhengcefagui1/201803/t20180312_110465.html.
Translation available at https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/
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undemocratic that it could not meaningfully resist the imposition of a system like the one that Reijers
envisions?
For understanding our own situation, overstating China’s use of technology can be just as harmful
as underestimating its use by our own governments and corporations. Because China is often held up as
embodying one extreme on a spectrum, misrepresentations of its law and practice can shift the
boundaries of the global discussion, making anything less invasive seem acceptable by comparison. This
can lead to complacency as technology shapes our societies back home. If we only envision a caricature
of China, with citizens labouring under an all-seeing algorithm, we ignore how subtle, and even
comfortable, a control-based model can be; we lower our guard to more realistic threats to freedom and
autonomy that surveillance capitalism is bringing to us all.
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Social Credit Systems: China and the West
Liav Orgad*
Reijers and Van ‘t Klooster have provoked a fascinating debate on social credit systems. The
disagreement among the authors is fundamental – factual and normative. There is no agreement on the
definition of a social credit system, the normative benchmark to evaluate it, the implications on the
institution of citizenship, the function of the Chinese version of a Social Credit System, and the lessons
to be learned from China’s system to western democracies. The reader is left with no clear answer on
whether a Social Credit System, in one version or another, is normatively ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (in terms of
legitimacy, fairness, or efficiency). Is the ‘problem’ of China’s Social Credit System related to its design,
technological function, and the regime in which it operates, and can there ever be a liberal-democratic
version of a Social Credit System? I want to address below one aspect of the debate: the comparison
between China and the West.

Credit Systems in the West
Scoring systems are well known in western societies. On the private sector, ranking is everything –
Airbnb, Uber, eBay, and even university professors (e.g., Rate My Professors platform). We rate one
another (as passengers, clients, students), products, locations, and situations; by using technology or
without it. Examples are all around us: agencies that rate job applications and provide employment and
credit checks (e.g., ‘Experian’); insurance companies that offer better deals for people who are willing
to give access to personal data like fitness trackers (e.g., Vitality’s Fitness Tracker Offers) and tracking
devises to record driving patterns (e.g., Allstate or State Farm); landlords who decide on potential tenants
based on ‘tenant blacklists’ in the housing rental market; and firms that base their decisions on data
bought from ‘data brokers’. The consequences of such ratings can be severe – a refusal to a job
application and health insurance policy or inability to return a product in case of being on a ‘store-returns
blacklist’ (for customers who often return products). The most known examples are private credit scores
in the United States (e.g., FICO) and other states (e.g., Schufa in Germany), which assess the
‘creditworthiness’ of a person based on financial criteria (e.g., payment history, debt burden, credit used,
length of credit history, and geosocial data), and whose score are frequently used by banks, insurance
and credit card companies. Such methods are expanding in the West.
Scoring systems are utilised not only in the private sector but also in the public sector. In Israel, for
instance, every citizen who serves in the military gets a personal score (a quality index, kaba), which
reflects his/her value as a soldier. The numerical figure (41-56) influences the placement in military
positions, which, in Israel, is likely to affect the future prosperity of the individual. Reported criteria
include personal data (education or motivation) as well as the result of a psychometric test and an
interview. At Ben Gurion Airport, every passenger is assigned a score according to the security risk he
or she presents, and there are ‘blacklists’ and ‘redlists’ according to the security risk.1 Scoring systems
are used by public authorities in almost every western country. Not all scoring methods are tech-based,
and some of them are unnoticed, but the public sector regularly rates the valuableness, reliability, and
credibility of both citizens and non-citizens (think, for instance, of a points-based system for
immigration).
At the municipal level, ideas of social credit are on the rise. In the past years, there have been attempts
to use technology to motivate ‘good citizenship’ through the creation of a catalogue of ‘good deeds’.
*
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Examples of deeds include voting, helping the elderly, taking first-aid courses, organising cultural
events, and undergoing self-employment workshops. Citizens can choose and implement good deeds
from a municipal catalogue, which will then be recorded and scored; based on the score, each citizen
will receive a reward from a parallel catalogue of ‘municipal benefits’. Rewards may include free public
transportation and bicycle rental, tickets to cultural events, and reduced municipal housing. The idea is
to use financial incentives to motivate civic engagement, social solidarity, volunteer work, and social
interaction with the hope that, over time, these incentives will create a culture of communal activism.
Different versions of this system exist in European cities (e.g., Innowave CityPoints in Cascais,
Portugal).

China and the West
In spite of the rise of social credit systems in the West, the case of China differs significantly for at least
four reasons. First, consent and choice: with some exceptions, western rating systems are voluntary, not
mandatory. Participation on private platforms such as Airbnb and Uber, and even getting a credit score
at a credit card company, are voluntary – one does not have to sign in and can always opt-out. In China,
however, according to the State Council Agenda, the system will become mandatory in 2020 and people
will be included in the scope of the system regardless of personal choices (existing regional pilots in
China are mostly voluntary). This will create a coercive scoring system in which participation is the
default.
Second, scope: rating systems in western societies do not usually score people qua citizens, but qua
drivers, landlords, and clients. By targeting people as citizens, China’s Social Credit System does not
target them according to a particular, limited profession, but according to being members of the political
community. By scoring people qua citizens, every individual and every single aspect of the public life
becomes conducive for being scrutinised. If a person has a low credit score in the United States, she
may not be able to get a loan, but this will not affect to which schools her child can be admitted or
whether she can travel on high-speed trains. In other words, the Chinese system is not limited to one
field but all-encompassing. Due to that aspect, the implications of doing wrong radiate beyond the
context of the wrongness into other spheres of life. The system is comprehensive for another reason. In
western democracies, the rule of law entails that everything which is not forbidden is allowed; this
creates a division, which is not always clear, between law and morality. In China, Social Credit Systems
target not only legally impermissible actions but also socially and professionally undesirable actions.
By giving rewards and impose sanctions to activities that are not illegal per se but, at most, are socially
undesirable, China extends ‘citizen-making mechanisms’ to the moral improvement of people.
Third, authority: China is developing a database whose sources are both public and private and whose
outcomes will be implemented by the public and the private sectors. Data sharing between government
institutions in China, and between them to private companies – such as Alibaba, Tencent, WeChat, and
Baidu – will produce a centralised database where many aspects of a person’s public and private life are
recorded: commercial data (e.g., mobile phone purchases), social data (e.g., social media contacts), and
digital data (e.g., internet search history). As an analogy, think of a data-sharing mechanism between
the U.S. Government, Facebook, Google, and Amazon. Such a database, and the system of carrots and
sticks attached to it, will allow China to extend the system’s logic from ‘good citizenship’ to ‘good
personhood’.
Fourth, human rights: having a high or a low score, or being on a blacklist, can have far-reaching
implications. The affected human rights are not peripheral but fundamental. If one has a low score as a
passenger in Uber, he or she may not be able to get an Uber ride, but can still take a taxi from a different
provider or take a bus or a train or drive by car; except for cases of discrimination, one has no ‘right’ to
get Uber services or a Facebook account. In China, the affected human rights are fundamental:
education, health, housing, as well as freedom of movement, human dignity, and privacy issues. Of
course, the implications of being blacklisted in the West can also be severe – think of a person who is
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classified as a high-risk at the airport or has a low credit score in the United States – and may infringe
upon fundamental human rights. Still, western societies have judicial review in which a person can
challenge the assigned score (and the system as a whole) and can vote in a free election on the future of
the system.
This is not a fundamental case against the social credit systems but, rather, against their design,
application, and consequences. In other words, it is not a matter of principle, but degree. The challenge,
with which political theorists are likely to struggle in the next years, is how to design a democratic
version of social credit. Eventually, a social credit system mirrors all the good and the bad things of the
legal system and the socio-economic structure that implements it.
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